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INTRODUCTION 
 
List of papers 
 
This thesis is based on four original papers listed as follows and co-authored by 
the thesis author: 
 
Study 1. Laitinen, E.K., Lukason, O. (2014) Do firm failure processes differ 
across countries: evidence from Finland and Estonia. Journal of Business 
Economics and Management, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp. 810–832. 
 
Study 2. Lukason, O., Laitinen, E.K., Suvas, A. (2016) Failure processes of 
young manufacturing micro firms in Europe. Management Decision, Vol. 54, 
No. 8, 1966–1985. 
 
Study 3. Lukason, O., Laitinen, E.K. (2016) Failure processes of old 
manufacturing firms in different European countries. Investment Management 
and Financial Innovations, Vol. 13, No. 2, 310–321. 
 
Study 4. Lukason, O., Hoffman, R.C. (2015) Firm failure causes: a population 
level study. Problems and Perspectives in Management, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 45–
55. 
 
In the thesis, all papers together are referred to as “the Studies”. 
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Motivation for the research 
 
The choice of research topic for the thesis is motivated by multiple 
considerations, which have been noted as follows1. 
Firm failure is a perpetual topic because as long as firms have existed they 
have also failed. Therefore, the research domain continues to attract the interest 
of numerous scholars (see e.g. recent literature reviews by Sun et al. 2014, 
Kücher et al. 2015, Amankwah-Amoah 2016). Despite substantial interest from 
the scientific community, different streams of failure research remain 
unbalanced and some domains (such as failure prediction models) receive 
remarkably more attention than others (see e.g. Pretorius 2008, Kücher et al. 
2015). When the topic of firm failure can be traced back to classical economic 
theories (Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004) and earlier studies applying financial 
ratios for analysing failure appeared already in the 1930s (Horrigan 1968), 
failure research started to develop quickly about half a century ago and many 
pioneering studies originate from this period (e.g. Beaver 1966, Altman 1968, 
Argenti 1976). Amankwah-Amoah (2016: 3388) has noted about the failure 
research that it “has become increasingly complex and fragmented across 
multiple social science disciplines”. While on the one hand, spanning numerous 
domains of literature proves the universal importance of failure studies, on the 
other hand, it also makes the composition of a literature review more 
challenging. 
There are different options for classifying the literature on firm failure. For 
instance, Pretorius (2008: 411) outlines a classification based on the context of 
studies, dividing them to four groups: “causes and preconditions, signs and 
prediction, recovery, cognition and learning”. The domain of firm failure causes 
suffers from a lack of theoretical consensus (Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004, 
Amankwah-Amoah 2016). Moreover, Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004: 22) have 
noted: “continued accumulation of fragmented and contradictory findings adds 
little to researchers’ understanding of organizational failure”. So far there are 
only a few large-population studies available about the causes of firm failure 
(e.g. Hall 1992, Baldwin et al. 19972) and the findings in the literature review 
by Amankwah-Amoah (2016) indicate that the interaction of internal and 
external causes of failure should be studied more thoroughly. Intriguingly, quite 
a recent study by Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008: 224) noted: “an all-embracing 
approach that relates the causes of bankruptcy to the characteristics of the 
company and to the financial symptoms of distress has never been applied”. 
Therefore, studying the interconnections of financial and non-financial variables 
in the firm failure process could be an innovative avenue of research. More 
                                                 
1 In this section, the emphasis on previous literature is only brief and a more detailed overview of 
it will be provided in Chapter 1. Also, this thesis focuses on a specific type of firm failure, namely 
bankruptcy, which should be kept in mind when following the context of the thesis (see Chapter 
1.1 for the choice of specific failure type). 
2 See sample sizes in Chapter 1.2.2. 
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generally, the underdevelopment of the research area could partly be caused by 
different notions of the term “failure” (see Chapter 1.1). 
An important deficiency in the available knowledge about firm failure is the 
lack of international comparisons of failed firms (Laitinen et al. 2014). There 
are studies3 available that compare (non-)financial variables for failed and non-
failed firms in different countries. The inter-country comparison has been 
elaborated more in the bankruptcy prediction domain, where some studies (e.g. 
Laitinen and Suvas 2013, Altman et al. 2016) have recently been published, 
which encompass a large number of different countries and develop universal 
bankruptcy models. These models show that pre-failure values of financial 
variables can vary from country to country (see Laitinen and Suvas 2013, 
Altman et al. 2016), which in turn can be caused by the presence of different 
firm failure processes. 
In the available empirical studies4 about different facets of firm failure 
processes, there is proportionally more focus on the USA and Western 
European countries, leaving former socialist countries (especially the new 
European Union member states from Eastern Europe) understudied. Also, past 
studies about firm failure processes have favoured medium- or large-sized old 
firms, leaving micro- and small-sized, but also young firms in all size 
categories, understudied (see e.g. samples used in Hambrick and D’Aveni 1988, 
D’Aveni 1989, Laitinen 1991, Moulton et al. 1996). 
The study of firm failure processes could lead to important implications for 
practitioners and policy makers. The similarity or dissimilarity of the pathway 
to firm failure in different environments can offer important input for applying 
or composing bankruptcy prediction models. When they know the specifics of 
different failure pathways, managers can more efficiently plan a turnaround and 
apply the necessary countermeasures, or ideally, avoid problems altogether. The 
population level knowledge of firm failure causes is important for various 
stakeholders, such as entrepreneurs, trustees and judges. Last but not least, the 
results of the study could help policy makers. For instance, recent European 
Union policies are guided towards improving early warning systems for firms 
and restructuring opportunities (see European Commission 2012). Therefore, 
the understanding of how firms fail in different European countries enables both 
legislative and executive powers to design and implement regulations more 
efficiently either at the national or supranational level. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on the underdeveloped areas in firm failure 
research, aiming to fill several important gaps in the available knowledge. The 
aspects emphasized in this chapter will be elaborated upon further in the 
remainder of the introduction, and more specifically, in the other chapters of the 
thesis. 
                                                 
3 For instance, the model developed in Lussier (1995) based on US data has been tested in several 
different countries, e.g. in Croatia in Lussier and Pfeifer (2001) and in Chile in Lussier and Halabi 
(2010). 
4 See the countries used in previous empirical studies in Table 1 in Chapter 1.2.1. 
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Research objective and tasks 
 
The objective of the thesis is to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
characteristics of firm failure processes in an international context by using 
financial and non-financial variables. 
In the thesis, the firm failure process5 is considered a pathway in a firm’s 
lifecycle ending with bankruptcy, which using non-financial variables depicts 
why and financial variables how a firm becomes bankrupt6. The lifecycle can 
be firm’s whole lifetime or a specified part in the end of it. 
The terms “financial” and “non-financial” in the thesis mark the origin of 
specific variables. Financial variables are mainly7 financial ratios and growth 
rates, which have been calculated using different variables originating from 
balance sheets and income statements. Financial variables have been calculated 
from consecutive pre-bankruptcy annual reports, thus their development in time 
can be studied8. Non-financial variables in this thesis are insolvency causes, 
which mainly9 originate from the information provided by trustees to court. 
Non-financial variables in this thesis are nominal variables indicating the 
presence of a certain cause of failure without noting when it emerged or its 
duration10. The primary focus in the thesis is on modelling the failure processes 
using financial variables, leaving the usage of non-financial variables as 
secondary. In the objective, processes is written in plural, as past studies (e.g. 
D’Aveni 1989, Laitinen 1991) have shown that firm failure occurs due to 
different processes. 
As the thesis is based on four Studies, each of them focusing on failure 
processes in a specific context, they must be presented in a common framework. 
Consequently, the following research tasks have been set for the thesis: 
1. Synthesize past literature concerning the definitions of failure and failure 
processes. (Chapters 1.1 and 1.2.1) 
2. Synthesize the theoretical foundations, study designs and results of past 
studies researching the characteristics of failure processes, including the 
behaviour of financial and non-financial variables in the failure processes. 
(Chapters 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3) 
3. Outline research gaps based on previous literature. (Chapters 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 
1.2.3) 
4. Outline research (sub-)questions to be answered in the thesis based on the 
literature review, research gaps and the Studies. (Chapter 1.3) 
                                                 
5 In the following text, „failure process“ is used instead of „firm failure process“. 
6 The description of failure process as a “pathway” relies exactly on the definition of Crutzen and 
van Caillie (2008: 301), where the integrative business failure process model composed showed: 
„in a global dynamic way, why (causes) and how (sequence of events) companies fail”. 
7 Studies 1, 2 and 3 apply financial ratios and growth rates, but in Study 1 two size variables have 
also been used in modelling failure processes. 
8 Such approach has been named „dynamic“ in Crutzen and van Caillie (2008: 291). 
9 See Chapter 2.2 explaining the origin of failure causes in the thesis. 
10 Such approach has been named „static“ in Crutzen and van Caillie (2008: 291). 
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5. Set up an appropriate study design to find answers to the outlined research 
(sub-)questions. (Chapter 2) 
6. Present the empirical Studies to find answers to the research (sub-) 
questions and fill the research gaps detected. (Chapter 3) 
7. Discuss and summarize the answers to research (sub-)questions, also 
outlining their contribution to the literature, limitations, future research 
directions and implications. (Chapter 4) 
 
The research tasks set for the thesis do not include those tasks (e.g. data 
collection, processing and statistical analysis), which have already been fulfilled 
in the Studies. The thesis research tasks mainly facilitate the presentation of the 
four Studies in a common framework. 
 
Thesis structure and context of the studies 
 
This thesis is composed of an introduction and four main chapters. The 
introduction includes the following sections. The “Motivation for the research” 
outlines briefly why it is important to study the chosen topic. “Research 
objective and tasks” outlines what is the author’s aim in the thesis and what 
tasks are necessary to achieve the aim. “Thesis structure and context of the 
studies” outlines which chapters and what content is included in the thesis, and 
also, what the main role is of the four Studies included in the thesis. “Novelty of 
the thesis” briefly notes what is novel in each of the Studies included in light of 
existing literature. In addition, a detailed contribution will be outlined in 
Chapter 1, where the research gaps will also be presented, and in Chapter 4, 
where the results will be presented and discussed. The “Contribution of 
individual authors” outlines what role the thesis author had in composing each 
of the Studies. 
The introduction is followed by Chapter 1 focusing on a review of the 
literature dealing with different aspects of firm failure processes. The thesis 
author intentionally does not apply the phrase “theoretical” for Chapter 1, as 
many streams of failure research (e.g. failure prediction) are dominated by 
empirical studies which are not grounded in any theory and/or do not seek to 
develop one. Chapter 1.1 focuses on the term “failure” and on one specific type 
of failure, namely bankruptcy (permanent insolvency declared at court) selected 
as the central definition in the thesis. Chapter 1.2 outlines previous literature on 
failure processes and is disaggregated to three sub-chapters. Chapter 1.2.1 
considers the definition of “failure process” and previous empirical studies 
about failure processes. Chapter 1.2.2 considers causes in failure processes and 
Chapter 1.2.3 financial variables in failure processes. In Chapters 1.2.1, 1.2.2 
and 1.2.3, research gaps will also be outlined. The topics considered in Chapters 
1.1 and 1.2 have also been elaborated in the Studies, and therefore, the main 
focus in the thesis is on presenting the relevant topics in an integrated and 
concentrated form, by not repeating the literature reviews of the Studies. In 
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Chapter 1.3, based on the review of literature and research gaps, the research 
questions (5) and research sub-questions (18) for the thesis will be presented. 
Chapter 2 outlines which data and methods are applied to achieve the 
objective of the thesis and answer the research (sub-)questions. All research 
(sub-)questions in the thesis will be addressed using (large) datasets, covering 
multiple countries in Studies 1, 2 and 3. All four Studies included in the thesis 
apply different statistical analysis tools. Studies 1, 2 and 3 apply financial 
variables originating from the annual reports of firms. Non-financial variables 
(failure causes) have been applied in Studies 1 and 4. All firms in the Studies 
have become bankrupt; that is, their permanent insolvency has been established 
at court. All the specific details of the thesis study design can be further 
followed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the four Studies included in the thesis will 
be presented. 
The thesis ends with Chapter 4 winding up the main results of the thesis. 
Chapter 4.1 “Discussion of the research questions” presents what results 
concerning each research (sub-)question were achieved and discusses them in 
the light of existing literature. In Chapter 4.1, the presentation of very detailed 
results is intentionally avoided, as they can be observed in the Studies. This is 
followed by Chapter 4.2 focusing on the implications of the thesis, Chapter 4.3 
on limitations, Chapter 4.4 on future research directions and Chapter 4.5 
“Conclusion of the thesis” shortly summarizes the most important findings of 
the thesis. 
The role of the four Studies included in the thesis can be seen in Figure 1. 
The pilot Study 1 applies both financial and non-financial variables to model 
failure processes based on matched Estonian and Finnish firms. Therefore, 
Study 1 makes it possible to identify whether the failure processes of the same 
kinds of firms differ across two countries and exactly how. As shown in Figure 
1, pilot Study 1 is followed by two sets of studies. Studies 2 and 3 focus on 
modelling failure processes using only financial variables. Manufacturing firms 
from different European countries have been included, and Study 2 focuses on 
young firms, while Study 3 on old firms. Studies 2 and 3 are methodologically 
more advanced than pilot Study 1, and are based on a large dataset of firms. In 
Study 1, the dataset was small (70 firms from each of the countries) and 
dispersed over multiple sectors. Unlike Study 1, where only factor analysis was 
used, in Studies 2 and 3, both factor and cluster analyses were used. In addition, 
the set of variables applied in Studies 2 and 3 is larger than in Study 1. Study 4 
considers only failure causes and uses a large dataset of Estonian firms. In 
Study 4, the whole population of publicly available court judgements from the 
period 2002–2009 has been applied. Unlike Study 1, which interconnects failure 
causes with failure processes detected by using financial variables, Study 4 
concentrates on the interconnection of failure causes with firm age and size. As 
three out of four of the Studies involve the international comparison of failure 
processes, the heading of the thesis also includes the phrase “in an international 
context”. 
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Figure 1. The role of the four Studies in the thesis (compiled by the author) 
 
Novelty of the thesis 
 
This section focuses on the novel aspects that the thesis offers in light of 
existing literature11. 
First, previous literature lacks international comparisons of failure 
processes. While Study 1 conducts an international comparison based on 
matched Finnish and Estonian firms, then Studies 2 and 3 do so on a larger set 
of European firms. As demonstrated in multiple literature review studies 
(Dimitras et al. 1996, Altman and Narayanan 1997, Bellovary et al. 2007), there 
is a large number of bankruptcy prediction models available from different 
environments, and there are also several studies, which create internationally 
applicable models (Laitinen and Suvas 2013, Altman et al. 2016). Still, the 
                                                 
11 For more detailed information about the novel aspects of the thesis, Chapter 1 including the 
research gaps, Chapter 3 including the four Studies and Chapter 4 should be consulted. Novel 
aspects in the thesis have been presented as a random list, which does not reflect their importance. 
 
Study applying only
non-financial variables
(i.e. failure causes)
Studies applying only
financial variables
Study 1. The pilot study provides
initial evidence of whether firm
failure processes (based on financial
variables) are different for matched
firms from two different countries
(Estonia and Finland). Evidence is
provided on how extracted failure
processes interact with non-financial
variables (failure causes).
Study 2. Evidence of whether firm
failure processes (based on financial
variables) differ for young micro
firms in various European countries.
The whole lifecycle of firms is
considered. Interconnections between
established processes and firms’ age 
and export behaviour are outlined.
Study 3. Evidence of whether firm
failure processes (based on financial
variables) differ for old firms in
various European countries. Inter-
connections between established
processes and firms’ size and export 
behaviour are outlined.
Study 4. Evidence of the presence
of different failure processes based
on failure causes and their inter-
connections with firms’ size and 
age in the Estonian population of
bankrupted firms.
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evidence about the (dis)similarity of failure processes across countries is weak 
and this thesis shows that in some countries the representation of specific failure 
processes found is similar and in others not. 
Second, several past studies about the failure processes of old firms are 
available (e.g. D’Aveni 1989, Laitinen 1991), which focus on different size 
categories, but so far studies have not been specifically conducted about young 
firms. In some studies (e.g. Ooghe and de Prijcker 2008), young firm failure has 
been presented as a single separate failure process, but no attention has been 
paid to whether young firms can fail in different ways or not. 
Third, an innovative aspect lies in the period of firms’ lifecycle applied in 
this thesis. More specifically, while Studies 1 and 3 use the last stages, as has 
been done for instance in D’Aveni (1989) and Laitinen (1991), then Study 2 
introduces a different approach. In particular, it considers the whole lifecycle of 
failed young firms. 
Fourth, in Study 1 failure causes have been studied in conjunction with 
failure processes modelled using financial variables. In past studies this has 
been achieved either using qualitative analysis (see e.g. Argenti 1976, Ooghe 
and de Prijcker 2008) or by interconnecting types of failing firms (detected 
based on failure causes) with financial symptoms (see e.g. Crutzen 2009). 
Fifth, in Study 4, large-scale empirical evidence is offered about the 
representation of voluntaristic (failure due to internal causes), deterministic 
(failure due to external causes) and integrative (failure due to both internal and 
external causes) theories of failure causes. Although past research has applied 
the taxonomy of internal-external failure causes (e.g. Baldwin et al. 1997, Arditi 
et al. 2000, Thornhill and Amit 2003), the interactions of internal and external 
causes is an understudied area of research. Furthermore, except for a few 
examples (e.g. Hall 1992, Baldwin et al. 1997), past studies have relied on small 
samples of bankrupted firms to detect failure causes. 
The above list of novel aspects arising from this thesis is not complete, but 
presents the most substantial examples. As noted earlier, the novel aspects in 
the thesis can have a largely varying weight. Namely, some of them consider 
topics which have not been (thoroughly) studied in past studies (e.g. the 
international comparison of failure processes), whereas others just fill (small) 
gaps or provide some technical improvements to the research of failure 
processes. 
 
Contribution of individual authors 
 
All Studies included in the thesis are joint studies by two or three authors. More 
specifically, three of the Studies have been written jointly with Vaasa 
University scholars professor Erkki K. Laitinen (Studies 1, 2, 3) and Arto Suvas 
(Study 2), and one study with Salisbury University scholar professor Richard C. 
Hoffman (Study 4). The author of the thesis contributed to each of the Studies 
as follows: 
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1. In Study 1, the thesis author was the second author. The study was 
composed so that two co-authors discussed and agreed upon the study 
design. Then, Finnish data was procured by Erkki K. Laitinen, which was 
followed by matching the Finnish firms with Estonian ones and procuring 
comparable data by the author of this thesis. The statistical analyses was 
initially conducted by Erkki K. Laitinen, but the thesis author possesses 
both the initial and output files of the analysis, and has checked the 
analysis results. The thesis author is aware of the same methods and has 
practiced them in Studies 2, 3 and 4. Also, in Chapter 4.1 the thesis author 
has provided some additional evidence based on the dataset applied in 
Study 1. Both co-authors contributed to the writing of the manuscript. The 
thesis author was responsible for submitting the study to the journal and 
responding to reviewers. 
2. In Study 2, the thesis author was the main author. The study was 
composed so that the thesis author proposed the study design, which was 
discussed and agreed upon by three co-authors. Then, the thesis author 
downloaded data from the Amadeus database12, processed it, conducted the 
statistical analyses and composed the preliminary draft of the study 
(including all parts). Then, the preliminary draft was commented upon by 
Erkki K. Laitinen and Arto Suvas and based on these comments the thesis 
author made the relevant corrections. The thesis author was responsible for 
submitting the study to the journal and responding to the reviewers. 
3. In Study 3, the thesis author was the main author. The study was 
composed so that firstly the thesis author proposed a study design, which 
was discussed and agreed upon by two co-authors. Then, the thesis author 
downloaded data from the Amadeus database, processed it, conducted the 
statistical analyses and composed the preliminary draft of the study 
(including all parts). Then, the preliminary version was commented upon 
by Erkki K. Laitinen, and based on the comments, the thesis author made 
relevant corrections. The thesis author was responsible for submitting the 
study to the journal and responding to the reviewers. 
4. In Study 4, the thesis author was the main author. The data for Study 4 had 
already been downloaded and processed before solely by the thesis author. 
The study was composed so that firstly the thesis author proposed a study 
design, which was discussed and agreed upon by two co-authors. Then, the 
thesis author ran the statistical analyses and composed the preliminary draft 
of the study (including all parts). Then, the preliminary version was 
improved by both co-authors. The thesis author was responsible for 
submitting the study to the journal and responding to the reviewers. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Amadeus database, administered by Bureau van Dijk, contains financial information from 
annual reports of firms from all European countries and it has been presented in a comparable 
format. 
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.1. Firm failure, permanent insolvency and bankruptcy 
 
Chapter 1.1 of the literature review focuses on the term “failure”, which has 
obtained various meanings in previous studies. Different studies focusing on the 
definition of failure (e.g. Watson and Everett 1999, Pretorius 2009) univocally 
establish that failure can and has been defined differently. The widest definition 
of failure could be “deviation from expected and desired results” (see Cannon 
and Edmondson 2005: 162). Firms can have numerous non-financial and 
financial goals, the latter being for instance concerned with the rate of return, 
profitability or sales volume. Cochran (1981: 52) notes that “failures as 
opportunity costs” could be the most suitable widest definition of failure. The 
use of firms’ goals when studying failure is limited, as they are normally not 
observable for outside parties and can also quickly change. The definition of 
failure is dependent of the research stream under consideration, namely in 
accounting and finance literature (especially in studies focusing on failure 
prediction), bankruptcy has been the predominant definition used (Mellahi and 
Wilkinson 2004, Balcaen and Ooghe 2006, Pretorius 2009, Kücher et al. 2015). 
This could be because information about bankruptcies can easily be retrieved 
from databases, and unlike other definitions of failure, a large proportion of 
bankrupted firms have been dissolved. In turn, firms can for instance witness 
negative profitability in times of enlargement and they cannot be unam-
biguously considered as failed or non-failed. 
Multiple scholars have relied on the definitions applied by data providers; 
for example, a widely used definition in US-based failure studies (see e.g. 
Fredland and Morris 1976, Sharma and Mahajan 1980, Lussier 1995) is the one 
provided by a recognized business information provider The Dun & Bradstreet 
Corporation. The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation (198613) definition is: 
“businesses that ceased operations following assignment or bankruptcy; ceased 
operations with losses to creditors after such actions as foreclosure or 
attachment; voluntarily withdrew leaving unpaid debts; were involved in court 
actions such as receivership, reorganization or arrangement; or voluntarily 
compromised with creditors”. The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation (1986) 
definition mainly focuses on legal proceedings and on at least temporary 
insolvency. 
As the declaration of bankruptcy and the inability to subsequently revitalize 
a firm leads to a compulsory (involuntary) liquidation, studies viewing failure in 
the context of bankruptcy have remarkable intersection with studies considering 
firm mortality. Cochran (1981: 53) considers business mortality as “death or 
discontinuance”. Although “death” and “discontinuance” can coincide with the 
deletion of a firm from an official register, “discontinuance” can also mean 
                                                 
13 The definition is provided on the turn of the cover page and that page does not have a 
number. 
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discontinuing (some) activities, leaving the firm registered. Also, in some 
legislations (e.g. in Estonia14), a de facto permanently insolvent firm can be 
deleted from the business register without an insolvency proceeding (i.e. it is 
not de jure insolvent). 
There is a fair amount of research considering different facets of firm exits. 
Still, the meaning of “exit” can vary a lot, as exits can occur because of various 
reasons and the creation of losses to creditors is not essential (see e.g. Marcus 
1967, Schary 1991, Wennberg et al. 2010). Exit has also been divided into 
different types in the literature. For instance, Balcaen et al. (2012: 950–951) 
distinguish between three types of exit: a) involuntary exit (following 
bankruptcy, compulsory liquidation or reorganization); b) voluntary exit 
through liquidation; and c) restructuring exit (being an acquisition, merger or 
split). Also, “exit” can be viewed as leaving a market bounded geographically 
and/or a market for a specific good (i.e. product or service), while the firm itself 
remains functional. Therefore, in some streams of the literature (e.g. firm 
internationalization), exit is not considered as failure (see e.g. Vissak and 
Francioni 2013). Furthermore, the use of “exit” in the meaning of dissolution of 
a firm might be arbitrary, as some inactive (and also insolvent) firms might not 
be dissolved but remain in a business register, albeit in a dormant form. 
Therefore, the scope of this thesis is limited to studying firm failures based 
on bankrupt firms primarily due to the following: 
1. Bankruptcy refers to a situation where a firm has “clearly failed”, as it has 
been unable to set up its business in a way to be able to service debt when 
it becomes due. Other definitions of failure might lead to a greater 
ambiguity without further inquiry, as they do not disclose exactly whether 
a firm is facing problems or not. 
2. It is difficult to obtain information about some subsets of firm failure. For 
instance, information about the expected rate of return can mainly be 
obtained through questionnaires. 
3. Firm bankruptcy and its subsequent liquidation refer to a certain point in 
time, when the activities have ceased. In the case of other definitions (e.g. 
earning losses), the situation can change, thus making the firm belong to 
either “failed” or “non-failed” groups depending on the period used in the 
analysis. 
4. As subsequently indicated in this chapter, the meaning of “bankruptcy” has 
similarities in different legal environments, making the international 
comparison in the thesis and the subsequent international application of the 
results possible. 
5. As bankruptcy is considered to be the final stage in the failure process (see 
e.g. Weitzel and Jonsson 1989), the usage of this definition for studying 
firm failure helps to integrate different definitions of “failure” in 
succession. For instance, it is possible to study, whether a firm was earning 
losses or had negative operating cash flow before declaring bankruptcy. 
                                                 
14 See the following Estonian laws: Bankruptcy Act (2016) and Commercial Code (2016). 
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Therefore, this thesis has been composed by choosing “bankruptcy” as the 
definition of firm failure. This definitely concerns the empirical studies included 
in the thesis, while multiple theoretical or literature review studies referred to in 
the thesis (e.g. Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004) have applied a broader meaning of 
“failure”. The limitation of the choice of “bankruptcy” as the central definition 
in the thesis is that the results might not be applicable in the case of other (i.e. 
broader) meanings of failure. 
Terminological divergence exists in studies applying data on bankrupt firms. 
For instance, studies actually focusing on bankrupted firms have also used the 
following words (e.g. in the headings of studies): closure (Wertheim and Lynn 
1993), collapse (Boothman 2000), crash (Jorissen and Otley 2010), crisis (Lin et 
al. 2011), death (Sheppard 1994), decline (D’Aveni 1989), default (Davydenko 
and Franks 2008), disappearance (Stubbart and Knight 2006), discontinuance 
(Bates and Nucci 1989), dissolution (Mitchell 1994), exit (Miklius and 
Casavant 1976), failure (Altman and Narayanan 1997), financial distress 
(Rotem 2011), insolvency (Hall 1992), liquidation (Hudson 1986), mortality 
(Queen and Roll 1985), non-viability (Argiles 2001), shut down (Singh and 
Mitchell 1996), termination (Gaeremynck and Willekens 2003), unsound 
(Appetiti 1984). Still, the majority of the aforementioned words have also been 
used in other meanings than bankruptcy in various studies. Therefore, numerous 
seemingly different studies are actually comparable, as they use data about 
firms with a similar status. 
Consequently, the meanings of “(permanent) insolvency” and “bankruptcy” 
have been discussed. Firms become insolvent because (Uhrig-Homburg 2005: 
1510): “either the available cash-flow is insufficient to meet payments to 
creditors (cash-flow shortage) or the firms’ liabilities exceed firms’ assets (over-
indebtedness)”. The combination of cash shortage and over-indebtedness can 
result in four different possible conditions (Uhrig-Homburg 2005: 1519–1520): 
a) firm witnesses both, or b) none, c) firm witnesses either cash shortage, or d) 
over-indebtedness. When three of those conditions (i.e. conditions a, c, d) 
remain permanent, they refer to permanent insolvency. The detection of a cash 
shortage and over-indebtedness have been respectively referred to as “liquidity 
test” and “balance sheet test” (see The World Bank … 2001: 29). A liquidity 
test should be the preferred criteria for detecting firm insolvency (The World 
Bank 2001: 29) and is used in most countries (Uhrig-Homburg 2005: 1510). In 
case over-indebtedness is permanent, it will also result in a shortage of cash 
(although this can occur with a time lag) and can thus be modelled using a cash 
shortage. The availability of cash can in turn be disaggregated into different 
variables (see e.g. Peat 2007); for instance, using operating, financing and 
investing cash flows applied in accounting (see International Accounting 
Standard 7 (2010) for a description of these cash flow types). When a firm has 
no cash left at a certain point in time and at the same time has also some unpaid 
debt that has fallen due, such a firm can be considered to be at least temporarily 
insolvent. “At least” in this context means that the temporariness of the situation 
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needs further inquiry. This “temporariness” can be detected during an 
insolvency proceeding. 
To determine the inability to pay due debt in future periods, a firm’s cash 
flows have to be forecasted, but cash flow forecasts normally cannot be precise 
over an infinite time span (see e.g. Elton and Gruber 1972, Chatfield et al. 
1989). Ideally, firms should start insolvency proceedings with an aim to 
reorganize debt already in case of future threatening insolvency; that is, in case 
it is likely that they are not able to pay a debt at some point in the future. In 
different legislations, the options for reducing and/or rescheduling debt can vary 
(see INSOL Europe 2014, McCormak et al. 2016). Also, during an insolvency 
proceeding, a question might arise as to whether a firm has submitted a petition 
to start the insolvency proceeding too late. This aspect is considered by the 
theory of deepening insolvency (see e.g. Heaton 2005, Siev and Goldfarb 2007), 
which aims to clarify the circumstances in which increasing debt is harmful to a 
firm. 
As noted earlier, a balance sheet test is used to detect whether a firm is over-
indebted or not (i.e. whether it has less assets than liabilities, or in other words, 
whether its equity is negative). A balance sheet test is only used as an 
insolvency criterion in a few countries (Uhrig-Homburg 2005: 1510). The usage 
of a balance sheet test as a criterion to determine whether a firm is permanently 
insolvent or not, has numerous limitations, and was therefore strongly criticised 
decades ago (see e.g. Levit 1973). 
The word “bankruptcy” has a legal background and reflects permanent 
insolvency declared at court15. The word “bankruptcy” originates from Italy, 
where it meant “the breaking of the tradesman/banker’s money table” because it 
owed money (Pontani 2004: 2). In several countries, the word “bankruptcy”, is 
not used in the name of the specific law. For instance, in Estonia the specific 
law is named the Bankruptcy Act (2016) (i.e. Pankrotiseadus), while in 
Germany the relevant law is named the Insolvency Statute (2011) (i.e. 
Insolvenzordnung) and in the United Kingdom, the Insolvency Act (1986). In 
the United States, on the other hand, the relevant law is titled the U.S. Code 
Title 11 Bankruptcy (2005), but in the definitions section 101 it does not define 
bankruptcy, and instead, the term “insolvent” has been defined. 
                                                 
15 For instance in Estonia, the Bankruptcy Act (2016) §1 defines bankruptcy: „Bankruptcy means 
the insolvency of a debtor declared by a court ruling“. For instance in Finland, the Bankruptcy 
Act (2004) defines bankruptcy: „Bankruptcy is a form of insolvency proceedings covering all the 
liabilities of the debtor, where the assets of the debtor are used in payment of the claims in 
bankruptcy“. Thus, “bankruptcy” can refer to a specific situation or a legal proceeding. Still, the 
intersection of the aforementioned definitions is, that permanent insolvency has been established 
at court, thus in the thesis, “bankruptcy” and “permanent insolvency declared at court” have been 
considered as synonyms, and therefore, in the thesis the word “bankruptcy” has been used. This is 
especially important, as Chapter 1.1 indicates, that in insolvency legislations of some countries 
the word “bankruptcy” is not used (see e.g. Insolvency Statute 2011). Also, as all firms included 
in the Studies have been dissolved after bankruptcy, then in the thesis “bankruptcy” directly refers 
to the decision to liquidate a firm because of permanent insolvency. 
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The way insolvency legislation is set up in different countries can differ. 
Generally, two types of legal traditions are distinguished, namely civil and 
common law, where civil law is in turn divided into German, French and 
Scandinavian legislation families (La Porta et al. 1996). Another common 
distinction between insolvency legislations in different countries is made on the 
basis of whether they are debtor or creditor friendly (Davydenko and Franks 
2008). Actually, the comparative sophistication of insolvency legislations 
between countries can be even more complex or far-reaching than just debtor or 
creditor friendliness. For instance, Blazy et al. (2008: 256–259), based on three 
variables (automatic stay on secured creditors’ claims, absolute priority rule 
between claimants, manager does not stay at head of firm during reorganization 
process), outlined four different types of insolvency codes: 1) a social pro 
debtor model, 2) an entrepreneurial pro debtor model, 3) a repressive model, 
and 4) a pro secured creditors model. Therefore, there is extensive evidence in 
the academic literature that insolvency legislation differs across countries. 
When considering the specific laws, extensive recent studies by INSOL 
Europe (2014) and McCormak et al. (2016) outline the diversity of insolvency 
legislations in different European countries. Based on the comparison of the 
legislations of the countries provided in these studies, the following conclusions 
can be drawn. Firstly, the conditions under which insolvency proceedings can 
be opened vary across countries – in respect to the time debt has to be due and 
the amount of due debt (McCormak 2016: 184–192). More specifically, in most 
EU countries the time a debt has to be due to start insolvency proceeding ranges 
in between 20 days and 2 months (McCormak 2016: 190–192). Therefore, 
European countries do not differ remarkably in respect to the time the debt has 
to be due to open insolvency proceedings. Nevertheless, how long debtors and 
creditors delay in submitting a petition in practice is an important consideration. 
Secondly, the availability and use of reorganization proceedings can vary a lot 
(INSOL Europe 2014, McCormak 2016). In some countries there are also 
separate reorganization and liquidation proceedings, but in some they are dealt 
with under the same law (INSOL Europe 2014, McCormak 2016). Therefore, 
commencing insolvency proceedings can signify different things in different 
countries, and therefore, the moment when permanent insolvency is established 
at court, could lead to less ambiguous results. 
Still, the application of data of bankrupt firms from different countries is not 
free from limitations. For instance, differences in respect to whether firms have 
attempted or gone through a reorganization before bankruptcy, the submission 
of a bankruptcy petition by the management or creditors was delayed, or the 
debt was renegotiated before bankruptcy could have some effect on the 
empirical results when modelling failure processes. 
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1.2. The characteristics of firm failure processes 
 
1.2.1. The concept of firm failure processes 
 
As Chapter 1.1 indicated, there are multiple meanings of firm failure, and 
therefore, the definition of a failure process is dependent on which definition of 
failure is applied. As this thesis applies “bankruptcy” as the definition of failure, 
Chapter 1.2.1 considers previous studies that have researched failure processes 
in the context of firms that have become bankrupt. The general definition of a 
process is (Merriam-Webster 2016): “a series of actions that produce something 
or that lead to a particular result”. Therefore, the definition of “process” refers 
to dynamics (i.e. development in time), triggers of events (i.e. causes) and 
outcomes (both, intermediate or final). “The particular result” in the thesis is 
firm bankruptcy. 
Failure process has been elaborated in Crutzen and van Caillie (2008: 301), 
where it is defined as follows: “it presents in a global and dynamic way, why 
(causes) and how (sequence of events) companies fail”. Furthermore, Crutzen 
and van Caillie (2008: 302) describe a failure process as consisting of the 
following four consecutive stages: 1) internally observable failure origins, 2) 
appearance of failure symptoms, 3) appearance of warning signals, and 4) 
bankruptcy. This thesis utilizes the definition provided by Crutzen and van 
Caillie (2008) by empirically viewing why (depicted using causes as non-
financial variables) and how (depicted using financial variables from 
consecutive pre-bankruptcy years) firms become bankrupt. 
The empirical studies of failure processes presented in Table 1 vary 
terminologically when depicting dynamically why and how firms become 
bankrupt. More specifically, these studies16 use the following terminology (see 
Table 1): trajectories (Argenti 1976), decline patterns (D’Aveni 1989), failure 
processes (Laitinen 1991, Ooghe and de Prijcker 2008, Laitinen et al. 2014), 
failure pathways (Moulton et al. 1996), failure patterns (Crutzen and van Caillie 
2010). 
The pioneering work by Argenti (1976) considering firm failure processes in 
detail, applied causes, symptoms and firm health to portray different failure 
processes (named respectively as “trajectories” in Argenti 1976). Although not 
specifically defined, Argenti’s (1976: 122) study considered causes as triggers, 
some of which were present already before the failure started, and symptoms 
such as indicators of failure (both financial and non-financial) observable to 
parties outside the firm. No formula was offered in Argenti (1976: 153) to 
calculate a firm’s health, but instead, it noted that multiple indicators could fit 
that purpose. Although being a highly cited work about firm failure, Argenti’s 
(1976) study has been criticised, among other reasons, for not disclosing the 
exact difference between causes and symptoms or not providing proper 
                                                 
16 The study by Wu (2010: 2373) listed in Table 1 does not specifically outline the relevant 
definition, and instead, considers different classes of failed firms. 
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scientific proof for the existence of the three failure processes outlined (see e.g. 
Gold 1977). Criticisms pointing to similar methodological issues can be 
followed in more recent studies; for example, Ropega (2011: 479) noted that “in 
theory and practice, it is often difficult to differentiate symptoms from reasons”. 
Later research has provided an improved meaning of the failure process. 
Sharma and Mahajan (1980: 81–82) present a simple concept of the failure 
process, where managerial mistakes and external factors lead to performance 
decline, which in the absence of corrective action leads to failure. Therefore, the 
concept by Sharma and Mahajan (1980) described both internal and external 
forces as being important contributors to firm failure. In another research stream 
focusing on firm turnarounds, a similar concept as in Sharma and Mahajan 
(1980) has been elaborated (see e.g. Robbins and Pearce 1992, Pearce and 
Robbins 1993). 
A more elaborate possibility to portray the failure process is the multistage 
approach. Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008) have outlined four similar stages as in 
Crutzen and van Caillie (2008). In Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008: 229–233) the 
failure process consisted of: a) initial shortcomings, b) negative signals, c) 
financial consequences, and d) final outcomes ending with bankruptcy. Still, as 
in Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008), four different failure processes were detected, 
then for each of them some stages (especially the initial shortcomings phase) 
differed respectively. The multistage model by Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) 
concentrated on managerial actions in the failure process. The Weitzel and 
Jonsson (1989: 97) model consisted of five stages: 1) a blinded stage, 2) an 
inaction stage, 3) a faulty action stage, 4) a crisis stage, and finally, 5) the 
dissolution stage17. Such a sequence of events as outlined by Weitzel and 
Jonsson (1989) might be better observable for larger firms (e.g. the “downward 
spiral” starting ten years before failure in Hambrick and D’Aveni 1988). The 
observance of managerial actions and their suitability (e.g. in order to consider, 
whether the managerial responses were overly passive or active, as indicated in 
van Witteloostuijn 1998) would demand information that is normally not 
available to parties outside the firm. 
In previous empirical studies notable divergence exists (see Table 1) on how 
to model failure processes. Table 1 presents the designs and results of different 
studies of failure processes. Firstly, it can be seen from Table 1 that studies 
detecting failure processes might not rely on theoretical foundations. Instead, 
previous empirical studies have been cited and their designs set as exploratory; 
in other words, to find out whether different failure processes exist or not. 
Secondly, the study designs show a high variation in respect to data and 
methods applied (see Table 1). Process extraction (i.e. taxonomy/typology 
creation) methods include qualitative (e.g. Ooghe and de Prijcker 2008) and 
quantitative (e.g. factor analysis in Laitinen 1991, cluster analysis in D’Aveni 
1989, different machine learning approaches in Wu 2010). The final years of the 
                                                 
17 As the Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) model was conceptual, then bankruptcy could be one 
possible option in the dissolution stage. 
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existence of older firms have primarily been modelled (see e.g. D’Aveni 1989, 
Laitinen 1991, Laitinen et al. 2014), not the whole life cycle. Samples of most 
studies are rather small, being below 100 observations (see Table 1). Thirdly, a 
common feature is that all studies detect a small number of processes, in Table 
1 specifically ranging from 2 to 5. Still, the simple number of processes 
detected might not be a good measure here, as study designs have been highly 
diverse (see Table 1). The results of the studies presented in Table 1 are 
commented upon in more detail below. 
The pioneering study on firm failure processes is Argenti (1976). In Argenti 
(1976), three failure processes (see Table 1) were described by outlining causes, 
symptoms and financial health for each. The failure processes proposed in 
Argenti (1976) can be considered more conceptual rather than scientifically 
justified, mainly because of a sporadically opaque study design. In turn, the 
follow-up studies present very clear study designs so their results are easier to 
rely on. More specifically, D’Aveni (1989) and Laitinen (1991) have reached 
quite a similar conclusion about the number and nature of failure processes, by 
focusing on the last years of the existence of old firms. Although using different 
variables, the studies by D’Aveni (1989) and Laitinen (1991) describe three 
failure processes (see Table 1): 1) a chronically inefficient firm for which 
failure symptoms were already observable years before bankruptcy, 2) a 
gradually failing firm for which performance becomes worse step-by-step 
during the years before bankruptcy, and 3) a quickly (acutely) failing firm 
which fails very quickly and for which the signs of forthcoming failure might 
not be observable before bankruptcy. In general, the processes proposed by 
D’Aveni (1989) and Laitinen (1991) share similarities with the last years of 
existence in Argenti’s (1976) processes. In D’Aveni (1989), a cluster analysis of 
a specially composed D-score (based on one non-financial and one financial 
variable) and in Laitinen (1991) a factor analysis of six financial variables was 
used to detect the failure processes. Argenti’s (1976) study has been developed 
by Richardson et al. (1994) by adding one additional process, but that study also 
lacks empirical proof. Moulton et al. (1996) used a simpler method to create a 
taxonomy by outlining a matrix based on industry and firm growth (both either 
positive or negative) and describing firms belonging to different matrix cells 
using various variables. 
In the late 2000s, two studies were published based on Belgian data 
describing different types of failing firms. Based on thorough cases studies of 
12 Belgian firms, Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008) described four different failure 
processes, and for each type of failure process, they provided the initial 
shortcomings, negative observable signals and resulting financial consequences. 
These firm types were (Ooghe and de Prijcker 2008): unsuccessful start-up 
firms, ambitious growth firms, dazzled growth firms and apathetic established 
firms. Furthermore, for each process Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008) outlined a 
specific list of causes. 
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Some of the failure processes detected in Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008) are 
similar to those found in previous studies; for example, the failure process of 
apathetic established firms in Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008) might be of a 
gradual nature as depicted in D’Aveni (1989) and Laitinen (1991). 
Similarly, Crutzen and van Caillie (2010)18 described five types of failing 
firms based on the failure causes obtained from a thorough analysis of 51 
Belgian bankrupt firms, for which information was obtained from different 
stakeholders. The firm types in Crutzen and van Caillie (2010: 452) were: 1) 
badly-managed firms, 2) firms that fail after a punctual error, 3) apathetic firms, 
4) firms serving other interests, 5) shocked firms. Although based on failure 
causes, the firm types in Crutzen and van Caillie (2010) share similarities with 
those established in earlier studies. The shocked firms and firms failing after a 
punctual error symbolize quickly failing firms and their main difference seems 
to be in the causes of failure; that is, for shocked firms, external causes are 
common, while for firms failing after a punctual error, internal causes are of 
greater importance (Ibid.: 451–453). Badly managed firms are characterized by 
the lack of numerous competences and are often young firms (Ibid.: 453). Non-
reactive apathetic firms mainly symbolize a gradually failing firm (Ibid.: 453). 
An important addition to the literature is the type “firms serving other interests”, 
which symbolizes a firm, where instead of ordinary corporate goals, firms 
follow different objectives (e.g. a firm created for conducting fraud) (Ibid.: 
452). 
Recently, with the rapid advance of machine learning techniques and their 
applications in the literature stream of bankruptcy prediction, several studies 
have been composed in conjunction with two areas (i.e. bankruptcy prediction 
and failure processes). Wu (2010) applied different machine learning techniques 
to cluster failing firms from Taiwan, and found that a taxonomy based on two 
clusters is the most efficient. Wu (2010) study mainly focuses on the application 
of different techniques and is thus lacking a more specific description of the 
processes detected. Similarly, different failure processes have been modelled for 
instance in studies by du Jardin and Severin (2012) and du Jardin (2015). 
Previous studies about failure processes are characterized by several 
limitations discussed below. Such studies have been dispersed over different 
types of firms. For instance, the studies by D’Aveni (1989), Laitinen (1991), 
Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008) and Laitinen et al. (2014) have included firms 
from different sectors. Also, these studies have treated the time between 
bankruptcy declaration and the last financial report available quite liberally. 
More specifically, either only the last available report has been applied or the 
time between bankruptcy declaration and the last report varies greatly. The 
datasets have been quite small (e.g. 49 firms in D’Aveni 1989 and 40 firms in 
Laitinen 1991). Therefore, the question remains whether a study design relaxing 
these limitations would result in similar or different failure processes when 
compared to those established in previous studies. Therefore, there is a lack of 
                                                 
18 The study is actually based on the doctoral thesis Crutzen (2009). 
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knowledge on whether different failure processes exist for similar19 firms 
(GAP1). 
Previous studies about firm failure processes have mostly focused on the last 
stages of failure using the example of old firms, being at least five years old (see 
e.g. D’Aveni 1989, Laitinen 1991, Laitinen et al. 2014). Based on case-study 
evidence, the studies by Argenti (1976) and Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008) prove 
the existence of different processes for young and old firms. Still, these studies 
propose only a single type of failure process for a certain age category, for 
instance in Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008: 228, 233) “the failure process of an 
unsuccessful start-up company” and “the failure process of an apathetic 
established company”. Therefore, there is a lack of knowledge on whether 
different failure processes exist for young firms (GAP2) and how those 
processes change with firm age (GAP3). 
In D’Aveni (1989), only a specific firm group (i.e. very large firms) has been 
applied, while in others (e.g. Laitinen 1991 and Laitinen et al. 2014) the data 
include firms from different size groups. As firm size distributions were 
different across countries, and the distributions of detected failure processes 
also differed across countries in the study by Laitinen et al. (2014), it could be 
assumed that firms in different size categories follow different failure processes. 
Still, such a proposition needs further analysis. Therefore, there is a lack of 
knowledge on how failure processes change with firm size (GAP4). 
An underdeveloped area in the research about firm failure processes is their 
variation across countries. One study (i.e. Laitinen et al. 2014) co-authored by 
the thesis author, but not included in this thesis, has considered differences in 
failure processes across countries, but in that study the firms used were 
different. In Laitinen et al. (2014), data from six European countries were used, 
but firms from different countries had largely varying mean or median sizes, 
and in some countries, the exact bankruptcy moment was not known (instead, a 
proxy was used based on the average length of insolvency proceedings)20. 
Furthermore, in the study by Laitinen et al. (2014), the traditional cash flow 
ratio applied in Laitinen (1991) was replaced by the ratio of operating cash flow 
to cash operating revenue. Therefore, there is a lack of knowledge on 
whether different failure processes exist for firms in different countries 
(GAP5). 
The interconnection of failure processes and firm exporting behaviour is an 
underdeveloped research area. None of the studies detecting failure processes 
brought out in Table 1 focuses on the comparison of failure processes between 
                                                 
19 „Similar“ in the thesis means, that unlike in (many) past studies, in Studies 2 and 3 firms are 
only manufacturing firms, they belong to same age and/or size groups. In Study 1 matched firms 
from two countries have been applied. Also, in Studies 1, 2 and 3, the time between bankruptcy 
declaration and t-1 annual report is more homogenous than in previous studies. 
20 A master’s thesis by Stahlman (2015), which was supervised by the thesis author, replicated the 
analysis in Laitinen et al. (2014). That thesis suffered from the same limitations as Laitinen et al. 
(2014). Namely, the time between the last report and bankruptcy was up to two years and in some 
countries the bankruptcy dates were not known. 
32 
exporting and non-exporting firms. In internationalization literature, mostly de-
internationalization in the meaning of full or partial exit has been considered 
(Benito and Welch 1997), but exit should not be considered as failure (Vissak 
and Francioni 2013). It has been noted that there is insufficient knowledge on 
how exporting firms fail (Nummela et al. 2016). Also, internationalization 
studies mainly focus on the survival/failure of (non-)exporters, but do not 
specifically compare failing (non-)exporters (see e.g. Wagner 2012). Therefore, 
there is a lack of knowledge on whether different failure processes exist for 
exporting and non-exporting firms (GAP6). 
There are a few studies available detecting whether failure causes are 
interconnected with failure symptoms depicted using financial variables. For 
instance, the studies by Argenti (1976) and Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008) 
outline some interactions of causes and financial variables, but without 
sufficient empirical proof. In D’Aveni (1989), the interconnections between 
some of the established processes and variables explaining the firms’ 
management boards, strategy and environment were studied, but these variables 
cannot be specifically considered as failure causes. In Crutzen (2009), the 
interconnections between failure processes established based on failure causes 
and some financial variables were studied. None of the aforementioned studies 
has specifically researched how failure processes detected using financial 
variables are interconnected with failure causes. Therefore, there is a lack of 
knowledge on how failure processes identified using financial variables 
interact with failure causes (GAP7). 
 
1.2.2. Failure causes in firm failure processes 
 
The initial theoretical explanations for why firms fail divide between two large 
streams – the deterministic and voluntaristic theories – offering opposing 
explanations for why firms fail (Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004). Namely, on the 
one hand, studies focusing on (managerial) voluntarism have argued that firm-
level decisions (i.e. internal causes) are the (main or only) contributors to the 
final outcome (i.e. success/survival or failure) (Daily 1994, Mellahi and 
Wilkinson 2004, Amankwah-Amoah 2016). On the other hand, studies 
emphasizing environmental determinism see outside forces (i.e. external causes) 
as the (main or only) factors conditioning firm destiny (Daily 1994, Mellahi and 
Wilkinson 2004, Amankwah-Amoah 2016). Still, several voluntarists or 
determinists do not necessarily oppose the other school, but rather rely on their 
own explanation (Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004). In business practice, it is 
possible to find examples of both voluntaristic and deterministic approaches. 
For instance, when a well-functioning firm suddenly bankrupts because of 
managerial fraud (see e.g. Crutzen and van Caillie 2010, Lukason 2013), it is 
highly possible to assume that only internal triggers were the cause of 
bankruptcy. On the other hand, when a firm is engaged in credit sales and the 
claims have always been secured, then in the case of client bankruptcies, which 
lead to unsatisfied claims and the bankruptcy of the firm under question, the 
33 
cause is of external origin. Still, in the case of the previous example of credit 
sales, additional questions need to be answered; for example, whether the 
securities (guarantees) were of sufficient quality or whether the share of 
(specific) credit sales out of total sales was too large. Mellahi and Wilkinson 
(2004: 32) have noted that voluntaristic or deterministic theories can explain 
firm failure “only in extreme situations, such as major environmental disaster or 
economic crisis, or extreme cases of management misbehaviour”. 
Nowadays, integrative approaches, which emphasize the role of both, 
voluntaristic and deterministic streams (i.e. failure caused by both, internal and 
external causes), are more favoured (Daily 1994, Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004, 
Amankwah-Amoah 2016). Although it has been noted that it is important to 
consider the environmental developments and managerial actions as a process, 
rather than statically (i.e. not by just indicating the (non-)presence of some 
cause) (Weitzel and Jonsson 1989, Dubrovski 2009, Ropega 2011, Amankwah-
Amoah 2016), the empirical analysis of the internal and external causes in the 
failure process can be challenging (especially in the ex post context) due to the 
lack of information. An elaborate portrait of the complexity of causal 
mechanisms in firm failure processes has been provided through the detailed 
case studies in Argenti (1976), Sheppard and Chowdhury (2005) and Pajunen 
(2005). 
The empirical research considering the causes of failure is infrequent 
(Altman and Narayanan 1997). Also, much of the available research focuses on 
causes statically, namely just detecting them and not positioning them in a 
sequence and/or timeframe (Crutzen and van Caillie 2008). For instance, in one 
of the most elaborate studies available focusing on failure causes by Baldwin et 
al. (1997), a thorough overview has been provided of different failure causes, 
but not about their dynamics. An additional serious limitation in studies 
focusing on failure causes is the absence of their interaction, namely how 
different causes occur concurrently21. 
All the empirical studies reviewed here are static; that is, they do not 
position failure causes on a time frame (see Table 2). So far, the dynamics of 
failure causes have been captured by a few case studies (e.g. Argenti 1976, 
Pajunen 2005, Sheppard and Chowdhury 2005). The choice of the four studies 
presented is based on the fact that those studies are highly cited and have 
specifically detected the causes of failure for bankrupted firms (except for 
Arditi et al. 2000, where the failure definition was based on The Dun & 
Bradstreet Corporation definition,22 and is therefore, somewhat wider). Out of 
the four studies, two (Baldwin et al. 1997, Arditi et al. 2000) have directly 
employed the taxonomy of internal and external causes, whereas the other two 
have relied on either factor analysis for taxonomy creation (Gaskill et al. 1993) 
or the researcher’s grouping based on the opinions of the firms’ owners (Hall 
                                                 
21 Out of the four studies presented in Table 2, only Gaskill et al. (1993) considers the 
interconnections of failure causes using factor analysis. 
22 See Chapter 1.1. 
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1992). Studies in Table 2 have used various data sources, such as owner 
perceptions (e.g. Hall 1992) and information from trustees (Baldwin et al. 
1997). Datasets in studies about failure causes have occasionally been rather 
large; for example, in the study by Hall (1992), even 857 firms, although in that 
study for each firm only one main cause was listed. From Table 2 it can be 
followed that internal and external causes obtained almost equal importance in 
only one study (i.e. Baldwin et al. 1997). Still, in Baldwin et al. (1997) no 
interconnections between the causes were outlined, and therefore, it is not 
possible to tell, the extent to which the internal and external causes exist 
together. In other studies outlined in Table 2, internal causes seem to be 
prevalent. 
A study by Thornhill and Amit (2003: 504–505), applying the same dataset 
as in Baldwin et al. (1997), confirms that younger firms bankrupt more due to 
general and financial management deficiencies and older firms in turn because 
of market developments. This finding is in accordance with the liabilities of 
newness, adolescence and obsolescence theories (see Aldrich and Auster 1986, 
Singh and Lumsden 1990, Henderson 1999), although the aforementioned 
theories mostly deal with failure rates rather than specific failure causes. The 
prevalence of different external and internal causes among old and young firms 
can also be followed in Baldwin et al. (1997: 56–59). What concerns the 
liabilities of smallness theory (see Aldrich and Auster 1986), there is no 
univocal understanding of what relationships to expect between firm size and 
failure causes. For instance, Aldrich and Auster (1986: 181) note: “empirical 
evidence suggests that small size does not make survival problematic”. 
Therefore, there is a lack of knowledge on how the voluntaristic, 
deterministic and integrative theories are associated with firm age (GAP8) 
and size (GAP9). 
 
1.2.3. Financial variables in firm failure processes 
 
Different studies provide either conceptual or empirical evidence about the 
development of financial variables in the failure process. The most general 
approach practiced has been to depict firm performance or financial health on 
the y-axis and draw trajectories based on the behaviour of these variables (see 
e.g. Argenti 1976, Weitzel and Jonsson 1989). Still, in conceptual models, 
authors often do not disclose what would be the best option for measuring such 
a specific single variable (see Argenti 1976, Weitzel and Jonsson 1989). 
Probably, different options would suit such a purpose; for example, variables 
like profitability (see Moulton et al. 1996) or some (bankruptcy) score (see 
D’Aveni 1989). Still, such approaches do not pay attention to how different 
variables are interconnected in the failure process. 
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Despite the abundance of bankruptcy prediction literature, no single and 
widely supported theory is available in that literature stream for how firms 
bankrupt (Balcaen and Ooghe 2006). One stream of literature originates from 
Beaver (1966: 80), who viewed “a firm as a reservoir of liquid assets, which is 
supplied by inflows and drained by outflows”. Beaver (1966: 80) also 
postulated that ceteris paribus the probability of failure reduces when: a) the 
reservoir of liquid assets increases, b) net cash flows from operations increase, 
c) debt decreases, and d) fund expenditures decrease. Therefore, Beaver’s 
(1966) approach focuses on the classical insolvency definition (i.e. the inability 
to pay debt as it becomes due) and discloses some variables important to model 
this. Still, bankruptcy prediction models based on cash flows might perform 
worse than models based on balance sheet and income statement data (see e.g. 
Laitinen 1994). 
Another stream of literature since the pilot study by Wilcox (1971) has made 
use of the gambler’s ruin theory in bankruptcy prediction. An important 
development of this stream is the study by Scott (1981), who conjointly applied 
gambler’s ruin and perfect access models. In the setting in Scott’s study (1981), 
firm bankruptcy was modelled using equity, which is impacted by net income. 
Scott (1981: 341) concluded that past empirical results from bankruptcy studies 
can be explained (although not fully) with a purposefully developed theory. 
Another stream has used option theory to explain the probability of bankruptcy 
(see e.g. Hillegeist et al. 2004). As demonstrated above, the studies by Beaver 
(1966) and Scott (1981) use different definitions of bankruptcy and prioritize 
different variables (i.e. cash flow versus profit) in the pathway towards 
bankruptcy. Therefore, when modelling failure processes, both concepts 
(liquidity and solidity) should be accounted, especially, as Chapter 1.1 
demonstrated, that both criteria are used as legal definitions of bankruptcy and 
firms can face multiple combinations of liquidity and solidity problems. 
Liquidity and solidity can be reflected by different variables, both 
dynamically and statically (Laitinen 1995). Static liquidity has been mostly 
depicted using a ratio of either cash or current assets to current liabilities 
(Laitinen 1991, Laitinen 1995). Liquidity has also been modelled dynamically, 
reflecting the ability to generate cash flows, and has been depicted using a ratio 
of operating or traditional cash flow to net sales (Laitinen 1993, Laitinen 1995). 
When calculating traditional cash flow (TCF), the numerator is composed of the 
sum of net income (i.e. net profit) and depreciation and amortization (Laitinen 
1995). Likewise with liquidity, solidity (solvency) can also be depicted in a 
static or dynamic way (Laitinen 1995). Static solidity has been mainly depicted 
using an equity ratio (total equity divided by total assets) (Laitinen 1991, 
Laitinen 1995). This ratio also resembles the criterion in the insolvency or 
business laws of different countries. Dynamic solidity has been depicted for 
instance using a traditional cash flow to total debt ratio (Laitinen 1995); a 
similar variable obtained high classification accuracy in Beaver’s (1966) study. 
Another known solidity ratio (which was also used e.g. in the ZETA-model by 
Altman et al. 1977) is the interest coverage ratio calculated as earnings before 
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interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by interest expenses. Indeed, the traditional 
cash flow to total debt ratio and EBIT to interest expenses ratio are similar 
ratios23. 
Most of the studies in the domain of bankruptcy prediction seek to find 
higher prediction accuracies for cross-sectional models (sometimes with the 
help of novel variables) and neglect the failure process topic (Balcaen and 
Ooghe 2006). Commonly, the descriptive statistics in bankruptcy prediction 
studies include means, standard deviations, medians, minimums and maximums 
of the variables used. High variation in the values of the variables used (e.g. 
based on the standard deviation or range calculated as the difference between 
maximum and minimum) can increase the likelihood that different failure 
processes exist, but does not specifically prove it. Also, cross-sectional 
bankruptcy prediction models normally focus on a very short period of time, 
most commonly one year before bankruptcy, when most of the ratios have 
already obtained poor values, and therefore, do not pay attention to the 
dynamics in the longer time horizon (Balcaen and Ooghe 2006, Bellovary et al. 
2007). Some statistical analysis methods used in bankruptcy prediction, such as 
survival analysis, allow accounting for the time dimension, namely by studying 
how the failure risk is interconnected with the development of variable values 
over time (see e.g. Balcaen and Ooghe 2004). Also, in some recent bankruptcy 
prediction studies, a self-organizing map has been used to outline failure 
processes based on different financial variables (see e.g. du Jardin and Severin 
2012, du Jardin 2015). 
In order to detect different failure processes, a theoretical model of identical 
investment projects was proposed in Laitinen (1991). The main foundation of 
the model was that insolvency (defined as a lack of cash) can be avoided by 
creating enough revenue (Laitinen 1991). Therefore, the model could be 
especially applicable in the case of older firms that have established themselves 
on the market and are therefore able to create revenue. The model, intended to 
be a simplification, was composed of six different dimensions important in 
disclosing how a firm can become insolvent, and these dimensions were 
represented by the following variables (Laitinen 1991: 651–657): return on 
investment (ROI) – a profitability ratio; change in total assets (GTA) – a growth 
variable; net sales to total assets (NSA) – an efficiency (of using assets) ratio; 
traditional cash flow to net sales (CFR) – a cash flow ratio (reflecting both, 
dynamic liquidity and profitability); total debt to total assets (DAR) – a ratio 
reflecting capital structure and static solvency; and current ratio (CUR) – a 
static liquidity ratio. Laitinen (1991) used a factor analysis to reveal the 
interconnections between theses six variables from three different pre-failure 
periods (i.e. t-2, t-4, t-6). Laitinen (1991: 660) established three factors, of 
which the first had the highest loadings with debt to assets ratio (positive 
loading) and cash flow to net sales ratio (negative loading), the second with 
                                                 
23 Traditional cash flow = EBIT – interest – taxes + amortization & depreciation. Total debt and 
interest accounted are linked with the firm’s weighted average interest rate. 
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current ratio (positive loading) and the third with return on investment (positive 
loading) and net sales to total assets (positive loading) ratios. In Laitinen’s 
(1991) study, 32.5% of firms belonged to a chronic failure group, 27.5% to a 
revenue financing failure group, and 40.0% to an acute failure group (see Table 
3), although the dataset was very small (40 observations). 
 
Table 3. The characteristics of failure processes in Laitinen (1991) 
 
Failure process Characteristics (based on variable 
medians) 
Chronic failure firm (32.5%) Most ratios were poor already four years 
before failure. ROI and CFR negative, 
DAR exceeding one, low NSA, CUR 
below one. Most of the ratios deteriorated 
during the pre-failure years. 
Revenue financing failure firm (27.5%) ROI and CFR were negative for two 
years before failure. The other ratios also 
deteriorated from normal levels during 
the pre-failure years. 
Acute failure firm (40.0%) ROI and CFR were negative only one 
year before bankruptcy, but the evidence 
concerning other ratios was mixed. For 
instance, CUR was low throughout the 
six years studied, but NSA was high for 
all years. 
Notes: ROI – return on investment ratio; GTA – change in total assets; NSA – net sales 
to total assets; CFR – traditional cash flow to net sales; DAR – total debt to total assets; 
CUR – current ratio. 
Source: Laitinen (1991). 
 
Despite a number of variables included in modelling the failure processes in 
Laitinen (1991), the main explanation of the processes can actually be made 
based on the traditional cash flow to sales ratio and return on investment ratio. 
This logically connects to the model’s setup, as the central idea in the Laitinen 
(1991) study was to model the sufficiency of revenue (and the profit emerging 
from it) to keep a firm supplied with cash. In D’Aveni (1989), the three detected 
processes were quite similar in respect to the behaviour of return on assets 
(ROA). Lingerers in D’Aveni (1989), like the chronic failure firms in Laitinen 
(1991), had a negative ROA for five pre-failure years. Gradually failing firms in 
D’Aveni (1989), like the revenue financing failure firms in Laitinen (1991), 
dropped to negative profitability two years before failure. Suddenly collapsing 
firms in D’Aveni (1989), like the acute failure firms in Laitinen (1991), had 
negative profitability one year before failure. An interesting aspect here is that 
in Laitinen (1991), acute failures had the largest proportion (40.0%), while in 
D’Aveni (1989) the smallest (only 10.2%). The greatest similarity was in the 
gradual failure groups: 38.8% in D’Aveni (1989) compared to 27.5% in 
Laitinen (1991). Firms with lengthy poor performance had the highest share 
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51.0% in D’Aveni (1991), but 32.5% in Laitinen (1991). The study by Laitinen 
et al. (2014) strongly opposes previous studies by establishing that gradual 
failure is the most common process (accounting for 62% of all firms analysed) 
for SMEs in Europe. In Laitinen et al. (2014), the median for ROA for gradually 
failing firms was also negative for two pre-failure years. In Laitinen et al. 
(2014), variables from Laitinen (1991) were applied (except for the traditional 
cash flow ratio, which was replaced with operating cash flow to cash operating 
revenue ratio) and in the case of gradually failing firms all other variables 
besides ROA also indicated a gradual worsening during the pre-failure years. 
In Laitinen (2005), a six-stage financial distress model was proposed. The 
stages starting from the earliest and the variables used to depict them (in 
brackets) were (Laitinen 2005: 78): 1) low profitability / high growth rate 
(return on investment ratio, net profit to net sales ratio, growth in net sales), 2) 
low cash flow (cash flow to net sales ratio), 3) increase in debt financing (equity 
ratio, cash flow to debt ratio), 4) increase in current debt (equity ratio, quick 
ratio), 5) decrease in financial assets (quick ratio), 6) payment default. The four 
processes outlined in Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008: 229–233) had different 
starting points, but all trajectories were explained using four similar final stages: 
1) insufficient cash flow and/or profitability (= lack of internal finance), 2) 
liquidity problems, 3) increase of liabilities (= weaker solvency), 4) mistrust of 
all financiers and acute cash shortage. Although the stages outlined in Laitinen 
(2005) and Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008) are similar, in Ooghe and de Prijcker 
(2008) the sequence of financial developments has been outlined in more detail 
compared to Laitinen (2005), and also Laitinen (1991). 
More specifically, in Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008), insufficient profitability 
and/or operating cash flow has been disaggregated to components such as 
development in sales, operating costs and capital expenditures. These 
components can play different roles in the case of different failure processes, as 
for instance firms can witness different underlying problems like over-
enlargement or reducing market share (Ooghe and de Prijcker 2008: 228–234). 
The changes in different income statement accounts (e.g. changes in revenue 
and costs) do not separately offer much informational value, but are valuable 
when viewed concurrently with profitability. For instance, the changes in these 
financial variables can reveal whether a drop in profitability was caused by: 1) 
an increase in costs being larger than an increase in sales, 2) a decrease in sales 
exceeding the retrenchment of costs, or 3) an increase in costs when sales in 
turn decreased. Beaver (1966: 80) has outlined that the ceteris paribus growth 
in expenditures will increase the bankruptcy probability. Another important 
element depicted in the models by Laitinen (2005) and Ooghe and de Prijcker 
(2008) is the “increase of liabilities”. Financial ratios like the equity ratio do not 
reveal whether a firm has been engaging additional debt to finance its 
operations. Therefore, the growth in total debt (or specific types of debt) can 
offer additional valuable information about the failure process. Beaver (1966: 
80) outlined that the ceteris paribus increase in debt will increase the 
bankruptcy probability. In summary, the most elaborate empirical setting so far 
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interconnecting financial variables in the failure process by Laitinen (1991) can 
be developed even further by introducing additional dimensions to the analysis. 
Therefore, there is a lack of knowledge about what the characteristics are 
of failure processes extracted with an extended set of financial variables 
compared to previous studies (GAP10). 
Therefore, based on the synthesis of the previous studies, different variables 
can obtain importance in the failure process and this has been depicted in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2. A general scheme of financial developments in the failure process (compiled 
by the author) 
 
Figure 2 outlines the general scheme of the behaviour of financial variables 
in the failure process. First, the managerial decisions influenced by environ-
mental conditions determine the values of financial statement variables. These 
values are obviously dynamically interconnected, as for instance, the 
availability of capital determines the investments made, and the latter in turn 
influences future revenues and costs. For instance, the debt engaged several 
years ago can also influence the availability of new debt and future costs. 
Financial ratios are calculated based on financial statement variables, and 
therefore, are directly influenced by their values. The classification of financial 
ratios on Figure 2 is directly based on the classification applied in Study 2, 
which is in turn based on a thorough analysis of previous studies in the domain 
of failure prediction. The scheme provided in Figure 2 will be applied in 
Chapter 2 outlining the study design and the specific financial variables applied. 
 
1.3. Research questions of the thesis 
 
The research questions (RQs) have been compiled on the basis of the literature 
review, which has outlined the knowledge gaps in past research (see Table 4). 
These RQs represent key issues that have not received enough attention in 
previous research. The RQs presented here have been set up intentionally in a 
Managerial decisions influenced by environmental conditions determine the following
variables (which are dynamically linked):
1. Capital: amount and types of equity and debt used to finance activities
2. Assets: amount and types of fixed and current assets to operate the business
3. Performance: amount and types of revenues and costs
Values of different types of financial ratios
(which are dynamically linked), e.g.:
1. Profitability
2. Activity/efficiency
3. Liquidity
4. Solidity/leverage
Determine
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broad manner to summarize all research gaps and the four Studies in the thesis. 
Each of the Studies can address the specific RQ in its own way; therefore, under 
each RQ, specific research sub-questions (RSQs) have been outlined. For each 
RQ and its RSQs, below a motivation has been provided for why they have 
been set in their current form. This motivation is logically interconnected to the 
research gaps outlined in Chapter 1.2; therefore, the information provided when 
outlining the research gaps is not fully repeated here. The relationships between 
the RQs, the Studies and the research gaps can be followed in Table 4. 
Concerning the motivation of the RSQs, the Studies should be consulted as 
well. The specific study designs addressing the research questions will be 
presented in Chapter 2. As each of the Studies includes hypotheses set to guide 
the research (see Appendix 1), behind each RSQ, it has been noted in brackets 
what hypothesis from a specific Study is interconnected with the RSQ in 
question. The thesis applies RQs and RSQs instead of using the specific 
hypotheses from the Studies. The main reason for this is that the thesis objective 
requires viewing all four Studies in an integrated way, which will be better 
facilitated by using RQs and RSQs. Furthermore, as in the case of using 
research questions, propositions (expectations) concerning them have to 
normally be outlined, and therefore, the propositions have been presented in 
Appendix 2. Still, these propositions are directly based on the hypotheses set in 
the Studies (see Appendix 1) and their motivation can be followed in detail in 
the Studies themselves. This set of RQs and RSQs represents only a fraction of 
the topics of importance and does not aim to solve all unanswered questions 
concerning firm failure processes. 
 
Table 4. Research questions of the thesis and their linkage with Studies and research gaps 
 
Research question (RQ) Studies where 
RQ is considered 
Research gaps 
considered 
under RQ 
RQ1. Do different firm failure processes 
exist? 
Study 1, Study 2, 
Study 3, Study 4 
GAP1, GAP2, 
GAP7, GAP10 
RQ2. Do failure processes vary across 
countries? 
Study 1, Study 2, 
Study 3 
GAP5 
RQ3. Do failure processes vary with firm 
size? 
Study 3, Study 4 GAP4, GAP9 
RQ4. Do failure processes vary with firm 
age? 
Study 2, Study 4 GAP3, GAP8 
RQ5. Do failure processes vary between 
exporting and non-exporting firms? 
Study 2, Study 3 GAP6 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
The format for denoting RSQ numbers is as follows: RSQ(Research question 
number – given in the thesis, see Table 4)(Study number – predefined, see 
Introduction)(Research sub-question number – given in the thesis). Therefore, 
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for instance, the fourth RQ considered in Study 2 with one RSQ will be noted as 
4.2.1. In brackets after each RSQ, the hypothesis number from the specific 
Study has been noted as Hn (e.g. hypothesis 1 is noted as H1). 
RQ1 focuses on the existence of different failure processes and is vital for 
the other RQs, as before comparing different failure processes they must be 
detected. Although previous studies have proven the existence of different 
failure processes (see Chapter 1.2.1), RQ1 addresses the detection of failure 
processes in several novel ways. Study 2 is unique, as there is no previous 
research known to the thesis author specifically about the detection of different 
failure processes of young firms, and no specific attention has been paid to 
micro firms. In addition to the use of variables proposed by Laitinen (1991) in 
Study 3, in that study an extended study design with more variables has also 
been used. Although previous research exists about the failure processes of old 
firms (e.g. D’Aveni 1989, Laitinen 1991, Laitinen et al. 2014), as noted in 
Chapter 1.2.1, the study designs have (serious) limitations, and therefore, this 
thesis uses a study design addressing many of the limitations of previous studies 
in order to confirm or reject whether different failure processes exist for old 
firms and what these processes specifically are. Studies 2 and 3 consider firms 
from a single sector and some other treatments (e.g. all firms have bankrupted 
and after that dissolved; the time between last annual report and bankruptcy is 
more homogenous) have been applied to make the large datasets from different 
countries as comparable as possible. Study 4 uses a taxonomy reflecting the 
voluntaristic, deterministic and integrative theories. In Study 1, failure processes 
extracted based on financial variables have been linked to failure causes. 
 
RQ1. Do different firm failure processes exist? 
 
Study 1: 
RSQ1.1.1. Do different failure processes (based on financial variables) exist in 
Finland? (H1) 
RSQ1.1.2. Do different failure processes (based on financial variables) exist in 
Estonia? (H1) 
RSQ1.1.3. Are different failure processes (based on financial variables) 
interconnected to specific failure causes in Finland? (H1) 
RSQ1.1.4. Are different failure processes (based on financial variables) 
interconnected to specific failure causes in Estonia? (H1) 
 
Study 2: 
RSQ1.2.1. Do different failure processes (based on financial variables) exist for 
young manufacturing micro firms in Europe (grouped as 3-, 4-, 5- and 6-year-
old firms)? (H1) 
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Study 3: 
RSQ1.3.1. Do different failure processes (based on two different study designs 
applying financial variables) exist for old (at least 10-year-old) manufacturing 
firms in Europe? (H1) 
 
Study 4: 
RSQ1.4.1. What are the shares of different failure processes (based on non-
financial variables, i.e. failure causes reflecting the deterministic, voluntaristic 
and integrative theories) in Estonia? (H1.1, H1.2, H1.3) 
 
RQ2 focuses on a major gap in the research of failure processes, namely on 
the comparison of failure processes across different countries. A few studies 
(e.g. Laitinen et al. 2014) have considered the inter-country comparison of 
failure processes besides Studies 1, 2 and 3 included in this thesis. Still, as noted 
in Chapter 1.2.1, in Laitinen et al. (2014), the dataset consisted of different 
firms; therefore, it has remarkable limitations. RQ2 deals mostly with 
exploratory analysis. The number of different countries included in the analysis 
through different Studies is as follows: Study 1 – 2 countries, Study 2 – 11 
countries, Study 3 – 15 countries. Still, one limitation is that in Study 2 and 3 
the number of cases applied in the analysis from different countries can vary 
considerably. RQ2 does not concern Study 4, as it is based on Estonian data 
only. 
 
RQ2. Do failure processes vary across countries? 
 
Study 1: 
RSQ2.1.1. Can matched Finnish and Estonian firms be distinguished based on 
pre-failure financial variables? (H1) 
RSQ2.1.2. Can matched Finnish and Estonian firms be distinguished based on 
pre-failure non-financial variables (failure causes)? (H1) 
RSQ2.1.3. Is there a contingency between the Finnish and Estonian failure 
processes? (H1) 
 
Study 2: 
RSQ2.2.1. Do extracted failure processes differ across European countries for 
young manufacturing micro firms (grouped as 3-, 4-, 5- and 6-year-old firms)? 
(H3) 
 
Study 3: 
RSQ2.3.1. Do extracted failure processes (based on two different study designs 
applying financial variables) differ across European countries for old (at least 
10-year-old) manufacturing firms? (H2a) 
 
RQ3 focuses on another domain not sufficiently elaborated previously in the 
literature, namely how are failure processes interconnected with firm size. There 
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is some evidence in the literature of interconnections existing between firm size 
and failure processes, but none of the available studies has specifically focused 
on this. For instance, based on Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988), it could be 
assumed that large firms go through a lengthy failure process starting even ten 
years before bankruptcy. Still, the results in Laitinen et al. (2014) indicate that 
the profitability of one group of SMEs can be lower even earlier than for large 
corporations in Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988). Therefore, previous studies 
offer contradictory evidence in this respect. In respect to failure causes and firm 
size, some simple descriptive evidence is available based on large samples (see 
e.g. Hall 1992), but the topic needs to be studied in more detail. More generally, 
the analysis of the interconnection of firm size and failure processes aims to 
contribute to the theories of liabilities of size (for these theories, see Aldrich and 
Auster 1986). 
 
RQ3. Do failure processes vary with firm size? 
 
Study 3: 
RSQ3.3.1. Do extracted failure processes (based on two different study designs 
applying financial variables) differ across size groups for old (at least 10-year-
old) European manufacturing firms? (H2b) 
 
Study 4: 
RSQ3.4.1. How does the likelihood of following different failure processes 
(based on non-financial variables, i.e. failure causes reflecting the deterministic, 
voluntaristic and integrative theories) in Estonia change with firm size? (H2.1, 
H2.2, H2.3) 
 
RQ4 focuses on another domain not sufficiently elaborated previously in the 
literature, namely how do failure processes change with firm age. RQ4 concerns 
Studies 2 and 4. Study 1 does not distinguish firms based on age. Study 3 
considers only the last stages in the failure process of old firms (the age of 
which is at least 10 years at the moment of declaring bankruptcy) and these 
firms have not been distinguished in respect to their age either. The lack of 
previous studies concerns mostly modelling failure processes using financial 
variables. There is evidence of comparing failed and non-failed young firms in 
bankruptcy prediction studies (see e.g. Laitinen 1992, Huyhebaert et al. 2000, 
Wiklund et al. 2010), but no specific attention has been paid to the aspect of 
whether failure processes change when the age of young firms increases and 
how. The interactions of age and failure causes have been modelled before (e.g. 
Thornhill and Amit 2003), but this has been done by viewing only specific 
failure causes, not a comprehensive taxonomy covering different theoretical 
perspectives. More generally, the analysis of the interconnection of firm age and 
failure processes, aims to contribute to the theories of liabilities of age (for these 
theories, see Henderson 1999). 
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RQ4. Do failure processes vary with firm age? 
 
Study 2: 
RSQ4.2.1. How do the number and types of failure processes change with a 
growth in age for young manufacturing micro firms in Europe? (H2) 
 
Study 4: 
RSQ4.4.1. How does the likelihood of following different failure processes 
(based on non-financial variables, i.e. failure causes reflecting the deterministic, 
voluntaristic and integrative theories) in Estonia change with firm age? (H3.1, 
H3.2, H3.3) 
 
RQ5 focuses on another domain not elaborated previously in the literature, 
namely how are failure processes interconnected with previous firm 
engagement and non-engagement in exporting. RQ5 is mainly exploratory and 
concerns only Studies 2 and 3. In the case of Studies 1 and 4, exporting 
behaviour information was not available for the thesis author. 
 
RQ5. Do failure processes vary between exporting and non-exporting 
firms? 
 
Study 2: 
RSQ5.2.1. Do the extracted failure processes differ between young European 
manufacturing micro firms (grouped as 3-, 4-, 5- and 6-year-old firms) engaged 
in exporting and not engaged in exporting? (H4) 
 
Study 3: 
RSQ5.3.1. Do extracted failure processes (based on two different study designs 
applying financial variables) differ between old (at least 10-year-old) European 
manufacturing firms engaged in exporting and not engaged in exporting? (H2c) 
 
It is also important to note what is the interconnection of the four Studies 
with the definition of failure processes outlined in Chapter 1.2.1: why (depicted 
using causes as non-financial variables) and how (depicted using financial 
variables from consecutive pre-bankruptcy years) do firms become bankrupt. 
Studies 2 and 3 focus only on the how question in a dynamic way, namely by 
using financial variables from different consecutive pre-bankruptcy years. Study 
4 focuses only on the why question by using failure causes statically. Study 1 
answers both of these questions, also by considering why and how 
simultaneously, but in Study 1 still the main focus is on the how question. 
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2. THESIS DATA AND METHODS 
 
This chapter describes the data and methods employed to achieve the objective 
of the thesis, fill the research gaps and find answers for the RQs and RSQs. All 
the Studies included in the thesis rely on empirical analysis. The data and 
methods applied in the Studies are described in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Data and methods in the Studies included in this thesis 
 
Study Data Quantitative methods 
applied 
Study 1 (Laitinen and 
Lukason 2014) 
Firm financial data from 
Finnish and Estonian 
business registers (i.e. 
EBR), bankruptcy causes 
from court judgements 
downloaded from 
Estonian Data System of 
Courts and its previous 
version Database of Court 
Statistics and Decisions 
(together as EDSC), 
Finnish causes from 
different public sources 
(including trustee reports). 
Sample: 70 from both 
countries, Estonia and 
Finland. 
Statistical tests, 
correlation analysis, 
binary logistic regression, 
factor analysis. 
Study 2 (Lukason, 
Laitinen and Suvas 2016) 
Firm financial data from 
Amadeus. Sample: 1,216 
firms from different 
European countries. 
Statistical tests, factor 
analysis, cluster analysis. 
Study 3 (Lukason and 
Laitinen 2016) 
Firm financial data from 
Amadeus. Sample: 1,235 
firms from different 
European countries. 
Statistical tests, factor 
analysis, cluster analysis. 
Study 4 (Lukason and 
Hoffman 2014) 
Bankruptcy causes from 
court judgements 
downloaded from EDSC, 
firm financial and 
background data from 
EBR. Sample: 1,281 from 
Estonia. 
Statistical tests, 
multinomial logistic 
regression. 
Source: Studies noted in the first column. 
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4), Estonian Data System of Courts (previously Database of Court Statistics and 
Decisions; Studies 1 and 4), Finnish Business Information System (Study 1) and 
various other Finnish public data sources including trustee reports (Study 1). 
The data collection and coding from all Estonian databases and the Amadeus 
database was done by the thesis author, whereas from Finnish databases by 
Erkki K. Laitinen. The Finnish data sources were used only in Study 1 to obtain 
comparable data from two countries – Finland and Estonia. 
The thesis makes use of two broad groups of variables, which will be 
described below with the methods for detecting the failure processes. The two 
broad groups of variables are: 1) financial variables originating from the annual 
reports of firms, and 2) non-financial variables as failure causes. 
For the detection of failure processes, Studies 1, 2 and 3 make use of factor 
and cluster analyses. In addition, correlation analysis and logistic regression 
have been used in Study 1. In Study 4, multinomial logistic regression has been 
used. In all Studies, statistical tests have been used. 
 
2.1. Financial variables 
 
In Studies 2 and 3 only and in Study 1 mainly financial variables have been 
used. Financial variables in this thesis are financial ratios, changes in financial 
statement variables and financial statement variables (i.e. total sales and assets). 
Financial variables have been chosen based on their theoretical importance and 
usage in the previous studies on failure processes and prediction (see Chapter 
1.2.3). Table 6 documents the general setting of financial variables for the 
detection of failure processes and Table 7 documents the specific variables 
used. 
The financial variables used in different Studies are similar, but not identical. 
The variables in Study 1 are similar to those in Laitinen (1991), but a few 
amendments have been made in order to include additional relevant variables in 
the analysis. Study 3 uses two settings, of which the first makes use of the same 
variables as in Laitinen (1991) and the second an extended set of variables. 
Many of the variables in Study 2 are similar to those in Laitinen (1991), but also 
several additional variables have been used. 
In Studies 2 and 3, the t-1 period means 0.75–1.25 years to bankruptcy, 
whereas the relevant mean and median values in both Studies are exactly 1.00 
years. Thus, the t-1 period reflects the time approximately one year before the 
compulsory liquidation decision in court because of permanent insolvency. In 
pilot Study 1, this figure has a wider span, namely ranging from 0.5–1.5 years. 
Table 6 documents the general setting of financial variables used in the 
Studies. Three columns in Table 6 indicate how many different financial ratios, 
financial statement variables and the changes in them have been used in each of 
Six different data sources have been used in the Studies, which are the 
Amadeus database (Studies 2 and 3), Estonian Business Register (Studies 1 and 
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the Studies, the last column presenting the total number of variables24 used. One 
column indicates which pre-failure periods have been included in the analysis. 
 
Table 6. The application of financial variables in Studies 1, 2 and 3 
 
Study Financial 
ratios 
Changes in 
financial 
statement 
variables 
Financial 
statement 
variables 
Periods 
involved 
Total 
variables 
Study 1 6 2 2 t-1 and  
t-2 
16 
Study 2 8 3 0 Whole 
lifecycle 
11, 22, 33, 
44 
depending 
on firm age 
Study 3 (two 
different 
settings 
applied, namely 
1st and 2nd) 
5 (1st) / 7 
(2nd) 
1 (1st) / 4 
(2nd) 
0 Five 
periods 
from t-1 
to t-5 
30 (1st) and 
55 (2nd) 
Source: Studies noted in the first column. 
 
The Studies make use of the general scheme of financial developments in the 
context of bankrupted firms (see Figure 2). Four change variables have been 
used in the Studies: a) change in total assets, b) change in total debt, c) change 
in operating revenue, and d) change in operating costs. These changes reveal the 
main underlying developments that the financial ratios depend on. As noted in 
Study 2 (page 1973) “changes in total assets show the developments in firm’s 
total resource base”; that is, changes in the resources a firm is using for revenue 
creation. Change in total debt reflects whether a firm involves additional debt or 
not. Debt is not disaggregated here, as a firm can switch between different debt 
sources (e.g. between bank loans or accounts payable), and therefore, using only 
an increase/decrease of a specific source of debt might lead to controversial 
results. Change in equity has not been accounted, as the empirical data revealed 
that firms included in the Studies rarely involve additional share capital or pay 
dividends (especially during the years closer to failure), and therefore, the 
profitability ratios already serve as proxies of the change in equity. 
Changes in operating revenue and operating costs (without amortization and 
depreciation, as it is an estimated, not real cost) reflect the two main develop-
ments in the income statement. These changes offer an insight into whether a 
firm’s revenues shrink or increase, accompanied by that fact, how costs behave 
simultaneously. The changes in these income statement variables provide an 
explanation for why a firm’s profit has changed. In the second design of Study 
                                                 
24 This means, that each variable has been multiplied with the number of years for which it has 
been calculated. 
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3, all the above-described four change variables have been used. The first 
design of Study 3 only makes use of the variables in the Laitinen (1991) model, 
and therefore, only the change in total assets has been used. In Study 2, the 
change in operating costs was not included in the analysis, as information about 
amortization and depreciation was not available for most of the young micro 
firms. 
 
Table 7. Specific financial variables applied in the Studies 
 
Type of financial variable Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
(design 1) 
Study 3 
(design 2) 
Size 
Natural logarithm of total 
assets1, natural logarithm of 
total operating revenue2 
X1X2    
Changes in financial statement variables 
Change in total assets X X X X 
Change in operating revenue X X  X 
Change in total debt  X  X 
Change in operating costs    X 
Profitability 
Profit (EBIT1 and/or net profit2) 
to total assets ratio 
X1 X1X2 X1 X1 
Profit (net profit) to operating 
revenue ratio 
X    
Liquidity 
Traditional cash flow to 
operating revenue ratio 
(reflecting also profitability) 
X  X X 
Static liquidity ratio(s) (quick 
ratio1 and/or current ratio2 
and/or NWC to total assets3) 
X1 X1X2X3 X2 X1X2 
Solidity (solvency) 
Equity ratio (static solidity, also 
reflecting capital structure) 
X X X X 
Traditional cash flow to total 
debt ratio (dynamic solidity) 
   X 
EBIT to financial expenses 
ratio (dynamic solidity) 
 X   
Activity/efficiency 
Operating revenue to total 
assets ratio 
 X X X 
Total debt to operating revenue X    
Source: compiled by the author based on the Studies. 
Notes: Multiple X-s mean that several variables from the first column have been applied 
and superscript denotes which specific variable from the first column has been applied. 
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Study 1 has also used the Laitinen (1991) model with only a few 
amendments. As the firms in Study 1 are from different size categories, it is the 
only study where size variables have been used in the study design. 
Profitability plays a central role in the existence of each firm, and this 
measure has been portrayed with the profitability of assets ratio in each Study. 
This exactly follows the example from Laitinen (1991) and shows how 
successfully assets have been utilized in creating a rate of return. Similarly, each 
Study makes use of the variable reflecting the productivity of assets in creating 
operating revenue (in Table 7, the activity/efficiency group). Only in Study 1, 
was this replaced by the total debt to operating revenue ratio. The traditional 
cash flow ratio (i.e. the ratio of the sum of net profit and depreciation/ 
amortization divided by operating revenue) also reflects profitability, namely a 
certain type of sales margin. But even more importantly, this ratio reflects 
dynamic liquidity; that is, how the created revenue contributes to the firm’s cash 
position. Traditional cash flow ratio is used in Studies 1 and 3, but not in Study 
2. This is because for the young micro firms in Study 2, the amortization and 
depreciation information was mostly missing, disabling the calculation of that 
variable. Study 2 makes use of three different static liquidity ratios. In some 
circumstances, the quick ratio might offer a more realistic picture of static 
liquidity than the current ratio, as in the case of the latter the non-cash items 
under current assets have mainly been estimated, and therefore, might be more 
subject to a possible misreporting. In all Studies, the static solidity is reflected 
by the classical equity ratio. In Studies 2 and 3, different dynamic solidity ratios 
have been used, mainly because for Study 2 the amortization and depreciation 
information was not available. As Study 1 mainly uses variables similar to the 
Laitinen (1991) model, the dynamic solidity variable is not used in that study. 
Studies 1, 2 and 3 differ in respect to the time periods used in the analysis. In 
Study 2, the whole lifecycle for short-lived firms has been used. In Study 1, the 
two pre-bankruptcy years have been used, as the ages of the firms are mixed. In 
Study 3 inclusive of five years before failure, the length of the pre-failure time 
used in the analysis has been chosen based on a similar time in previous studies 
(e.g. six years in Laitinen 1991, six years in Moulton et al. 1996 and four years 
in Laitinen et al. 2014). 
 
2.2. Failure causes 
 
This chapter focuses on obtaining information about failure causes. As only 6 
out of 18 RSQs focus on failure causes (1 RSQ only on Finland, 4 RSQs only 
on Estonia, 1 RSQ on Finland and Estonia together), then in this chapter, 
general and/or Estonia-specific information will be presented first, leaving 
Finland-specific and country-comparative information to the end of the chapter. 
Obtaining information about failure causes is remarkably more challenging 
compared to the usage of financial data, and in Chapters 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, 
multiple different options from previous studies about how to obtain such 
information were presented. Specifically, Chapters 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 outlined that 
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failure causes can originate from either managers/owners or trustees/court, but 
the former might be unreliable (Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004: 33). Therefore, 
trustees must be considered a more impartial source of information. When using 
trustee opinions about failure causes, two questions can arise: 1) how much 
work they have done to detect the causes in a specific bankruptcy case, and 2) 
what are the specific cause detection algorithms. Unfortunately, the afore-
mentioned two questions might remain undisclosed when using the information, 
which has already been presented by the trustees (e.g. the information about the 
failure causes in the court judgement). Still, when a population is enough large 
(especially when the whole population is used), a reasonable expectation would 
be that the results are not influenced by the peculiarities of specific trustees 
(including their work practice). In the bankruptcy laws of both countries (i.e. 
Finland and Estonia), trustees are obliged to detect bankruptcy causes and 
present them to court25. Therefore, the failure causes presented by trustees can 
be extracted from court documents (including the court judgement about each 
bankruptcy case). 
Another option would be to run a questionnaire among trustees (see e.g. 
Baldwin et al. 1997). Still, conducting a questionnaire should be done in a live 
principle (namely, at the time when the trustees are working with the specific 
cases), as the ex post approach would probably just duplicate what the trustee 
has already noted to the court. It is also evident that treating cases in a live 
principle (as in Baldwin et al. 1997 and Crutzen 2009) does not make it possible 
to capture a population of such size and variety as in Study 4. Moreover, 
questionnaires can include a bias by leading respondents towards the questions 
provided, and therefore, important aspects of the failure process might remain 
undisclosed. Therefore, in previous studies, interviews have also been 
conducted on the participation of several stakeholders (see e.g. Crutzen 2009) to 
find out the causes of failure, but as such a method is extremely laborious, 
evidently only a small number of cases can be used. Therefore, the author is 
well aware of the different options for obtaining information about the failure 
causes, and the usage of court judgements has been a deliberate choice in the 
thesis. 
An important question is the reliability of the information about failure 
causes in the court judgements. There is no grounds to suspect intentional 
misreporting of the causes, as in Estonia the trustees are obliged to state 
bankruptcy causes to the court according to the Bankruptcy Act (2016). In turn, 
the question of whether a trustee can detect the causes correctly, can arise. As 
the dataset of Estonian court judgements applied in this thesis includes 
assessments by 53 different trustees, it can be assumed that any assessment 
biases or faults in the data are random. Each trustee can have its own 
methodology for making the assessment about causes, but that methodology is 
usually not disclosed in the court judgement. 
                                                 
25 See Bankruptcy Act (2004) and Bankruptcy Act (2016). 
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Due to the diversity of information presented in court judgements, it is 
evident that they might not be applicable when failure causes are needed in a 
very disaggregate format. This has also been kept in mind when composing 
Studies 1 and 4. For instance, the taxonomy of failure causes in Study 4 is in a 
very aggregate form. An example of the failure causes summarized from court 
judgements about bankrupt manufacturing firms can be followed in a recent 
study (see Lukason and Hoffman 2014: 90) co-authored by the thesis author. 
The detection of causes from Estonian court judgements was conducted by 
the thesis author. As the causes have normally been brought out as a list in court 
judgements, this list can easily be copied from the court judgement. On the 
other hand, their classification into relevant taxonomies can lead to a bias from 
the person doing the classifying. Therefore, in Study 4, a separate person has 
also been used to classify the causes to provide reliability in the classification 
process. Such a separate classifier was not used in Study 1, but as in Study 4 
there were no differences between the results obtained by the thesis author and 
the independent assessor, this provides at least some support for the accuracy of 
the thesis author’s classification in Study 1 as well. 
When classifying causes as internal and external, past examples from the 
literature were used in Studies 1 (see page 816) and 4 (see page 49). Examples 
of classifying causes as internal and external can be followed in other studies 
co-authored by the thesis author (see Lukason and Hoffman 2014: 90, Lukason 
et al. 2016: 177–178). 
In summary, the usage of bankruptcy causes from court judgements 
evidently has limitations. As noted above, two major questions might arise. 
First, there is no information available for exactly how proficient an average 
trustee is in detecting the failure causes (i.e. in determining the causality). This 
also concerns whether all of the failure causes noted could be considered of 
equal importance or not. In previous important studies (e.g. Baldwin et al. 1997, 
Thornhill and Amit 2003), such proficiency has not been questioned, and 
therefore, it could be assumed that the use of information from trustees is an 
acceptable choice in the available literature. Second, some failure causes might 
cause ambivalence when coding, namely whether to consider them as purely 
internal or external. In such cases the court judgement must always be consulted 
in more detail to understand how such a cause has emerged in the failure 
process. 
In summary, the stages of obtaining the failure causes for statistical analysis 
were as follows: 
1. Obtaining a list of court judgements about bankruptcies for the period 
2002–2009 from the Estonian Ministry of Justice in late 2009. 
2. Downloading court judgements from the Estonian Data System of Courts 
(judgements from 2006 on) and its previous version Database of Court 
Statistics and Decisions (judgements to 2005)26. 
                                                 
26 The difference in the databases concerns their structure, not the content of court judgements. 
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3. Linking court judgements with firms’ business registry codes. Firms’ 
business registry codes must be found from the judgements, as there was 
no separate file available to link the court judgement numbers and the 
firms’ business registry codes. 
4. Extraction of the text concerning the failure causes from the court 
judgements. In this phase, the court judgements which did not have the 
failure causes listed or did not present them understandably, were 
abandoned. 
5. Writing out specific failure causes from the extracted text about the failure 
causes. 
6. Classification of the failure causes into an intermediate taxonomy (18 
causes) to facilitate their quick use afterwards. 
7. Usage of the intermediate taxonomy to classify causes for the taxonomy in 
Study 1. 
8. Usage of the intermediate taxonomy to classify causes for the taxonomy in 
Study 4. As noted earlier, in Study 4 an independent researcher was given a 
sample of the texts including failure causes (see point 4) and was asked to 
classify them to the taxonomy applied in Study 4. The latter was necessary 
for inter-rater reliability. 
 
The thesis includes Study 1, in which Finnish and Estonian firms are 
compared in respect to failure causes (RSQ2.1.2), and also in each of the 
countries separately, the association of failure causes and failure processes 
(detected by using financial variables) has been studied (RSQ1.1.3 and 
RSQ1.1.4). Bankruptcy causes for Finnish firms have been obtained from 
different public sources (i.e. trustee reports, annual reports, published 
interviews). When starting to compose Study 1, the collection of information 
about the failure causes from both countries had already ended; therefore, it was 
decided with co-author Erkki K. Laitinen to unify the available information 
under a common taxonomy, and not to start a new inquiry into failure causes 
(e.g. based on questionnaires). A unified taxonomy consisting of five different 
causes was agreed upon. Subsequently, the original Finnish and Estonian causes 
were classified into a 5-cause taxonomy (general external environment 
developments, specific external environment developments, problems/lacks in 
general management, financial management and control, operations 
management). The classification of the causes from both countries to the 
homogenous taxonomy was administered first by the thesis author, then 
checked by co-author Erkki K. Laitinen, and then, the final classification was 
agreed upon. The thesis author acknowledges that the study designs concerning 
the few RSQs concerned with inter-country comparison of failure causes are 
subject to several limitations, but the best effort was made with the available 
information. 
 
 
54 
2.3. Detection of failure processes with financial variables 
 
The research on whether different failure processes exist is a search for a 
taxonomy/typology in the population. In practice, the probability of finding two 
identical failing firms based on their financial ratio values is almost zero. As a 
simple example, based only on the fact of whether pre-failure profitability is 
negative or positive, and looking at two pre-failure periods t-1 and t-2, there are 
four different combinations possible: a) positive in both periods, b) negative in 
both periods, c) positive in t-1 and negative in t-2, d) negative in t-1 and 
positive in t-2. When expanding previous analysis by increasing the number of 
observed periods or introducing additional variables, the number of different 
failing firm types will grow very quickly. As financial variables are originally 
continuous variables, the problem of detecting different types of failing firms 
becomes even more difficult. Therefore, the creation of a taxonomy of failure 
processes inevitably means that groups of firms where the behaviour of studied 
variables is similar during the pre-failure years are sought. In such a setting, the 
content of the term “similar” will be mainly a question of the study design 
chosen. More specifically, there is no universal rule available for this purpose. 
When using statistical techniques to model failure processes, financial 
variables from different points in time are a useful input. First, there is a solid 
theoretical basis for their inclusion (see e.g. Laitinen 1991). Second, financial 
variables are continuous variables from different points in time, and therefore, 
suit statistical analysis well. Failure causes extracted from court judgements 
reflect the whole pre-failure period (i.e. court judgements normally do not 
include information about the time the causes emerged) and are of 
binary/nominal nature (i.e. whether some cause was present or which of the 
different causes the failure was subject to). Moreover, the possibility that some 
causes detected might have a certain overlap with financial variables (e.g. the 
trustee detected that a firm was undercapitalized), cannot be excluded. 
Therefore, it is not reasonable to apply failure causes simultaneously with 
financial variables in the statistical analysis. 
As noted in Chapter 1.2.1, the research question about detecting different 
failure processes has been addressed either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
Among quantitative methods, factor analysis (e.g. Laitinen 1991) and cluster 
analysis (e.g. D’Aveni 1989) have proven to be useful in detecting different 
failure processes. Also, in a study co-authored by the thesis author, the 
consecutive use of factor and cluster analyses for the detection of failure 
processes was introduced and was efficient in taxonomy creation (see Laitinen 
et al. 2014). Subsequently, the settings for the factor and cluster analyses in the 
Studies have been summarized in Table 8. 
It is important to re-emphasize an important aspect. The detection of failure 
processes in Studies 1, 2 and 3 by applying either factor or factor-cluster 
analysis on financial variables from different pre-failure points in time is 
directed at finding the main failure processes among the analysed firms, rather 
than each possible pathway towards bankruptcy. 
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Table 8. Settings for factor and cluster analyses in the Studies 
 
Study Method Robustness check and notes 
Study 1 Factor analysis method: 
unweighted least squares and 
Varimax rotation. Firms classified 
to processes based on the largest 
factor score. 
Larger number of factors and 
subsequent classification of factor 
scores with k-medians did not yield 
different results. The usage of  
k-means and k-medians with 
financial variables resulted in a 
situation, were most of the cases 
were in one cluster (evidently, 
because financial variables are 
skewed, unstandardized and have 
different scales). Financial variables 
were winsorized before usage in the 
factor analysis. Variance explained 
by factor solutions was acceptably 
high (i.e. 82%). 
Study 2 Factor analysis method: 
unweighted least squares and 
Varimax rotation. Cluster analysis 
method: factor scores clustered 
using k-medians and solution 
chosen based on the first local 
maximum of pseudo-F statistic. 
Firms classified to processes based 
on their cluster membership. 
Higher values for k than that chosen 
in k-medians clustering did not yield 
a solution with higher pseudo-F. 
Financial variables winsorized 
before usage in the factor analysis. 
Variance explained by factor 
solutions was acceptably high (i.e. 
77%–81%). 
Study 3 Factor analysis: unweighted least 
squares and Varimax rotation. 
Cluster analysis: factor scores 
clustered using k-medians and 
solution chosen based on the first 
local maximum of pseudo-F 
statistic. Firms classified to 
processes based on their cluster 
membership. 
Higher values for k than that the 
chosen in k-medians clustering did 
not yield a solution with higher 
pseudo-F. Financial variables 
winsorized before usage in the factor 
analysis. Variance explained by 
factor solutions was acceptably high 
(80%–84%). 
Source: compiled by the author based on the Studies. 
 
The author of the thesis is aware that different extensions to classical factor 
and cluster analysis methods exist, but also various machine learning tools can 
be applied. As noted in Jain (2010), there are by now thousands of clustering 
algorithms available. Still, it is reasonable to apply a known method, when it is 
applicable to specific data. Moreover, in the case of machine learning 
clustering, it might be difficult or impossible to follow based on what criteria 
firms are clustered, but the latter is essential for the replicability of the analysis. 
The tandem factor-cluster analysis has been applied in multiple areas of 
economics and management in different studies, some of which are highly cited 
and published in journals with high impact factor (see e.g. Cha et al. 1995, Chen 
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et al. 2001, Davidova et al. 2003, Iraizoz et al. 2007, Jun and McCleary 1999, 
McDougall and Robinson 1990). Of course, the thesis author is aware that like 
all clustering methods, the tandem factor-cluster analysis is also not free from 
limitations, but it has proven to be efficient in the creation of a taxonomy of 
failure processes (see Laitinen et al. 2014), before being applied in Studies 2 
and 3 in this thesis. 
 
2.4. Summarized study designs 
 
Below short descriptions of the study designs in each of the Studies have been 
provided. This makes it possible to follow quickly how the results in different 
Studies have been obtained. 
 
Study 1 design 
 
For Study 1, financial and non-financial variables were initially available for 70 
Finnish bankrupt firms, which had been collected in Finland during a research 
project. The Finnish firms were matched with Estonian firms, which had the 
same information available. The matching was achieved by finding firms from 
Estonia as similar as possible to the Finnish ones based on industry, size 
(number of workers) and time of bankruptcy. Although the entire Estonian 
population was used, there were few suitable firms with the necessary 
information available for each match. Failure causes were initially based on 
different taxonomies, and therefore, those taxonomies had to be unified. 
In the first stage of the analysis, statistical tests were run and logistic 
regression was used to find out how the failure causes and financial variables 
differ for firms from the two countries. Then, failure processes were detected 
for each country separately using factor analysis on financial variables. As in 
Laitinen (1991), each factor was considered to depict a specific failure process 
and firms were classified to follow a specific failure process based on the 
highest factor score value. After that, the contingencies of failure processes in 
the two countries were checked using a chi-square test (based on firm 
groupings) and correlation analysis (based on factor score values). In the final 
stage, the interconnection of failure causes and extracted processes were studied 
in each country separately using a statistical test. 
 
Study 2 design 
 
The data in Study 2 originated from the Amadeus database and concerns young 
manufacturing firms from different European countries. In total, 1,215 firms 
have been used in the analysis, which breaks down into four groups: 3-, 4-, 5- 
and 6-year-old firms. Each group was analysed separately, as the aim was to 
model the whole lifetime of firms, and therefore, different lifetimes would have 
complicated the analysis. All firms belonged to NACE C – the manufacturing 
industry. The limitation of the analysis on a single sector was necessary, as in 
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this way the possible sectoral impacts on the results were eliminated. The 
largest number of firms originated from Italy and France, the other countries 
being represented with a lower number of cases. 
The financial variables (ratios and changes) were selected based on previous 
studies of failure prediction and (old firm) failure processes. The detection of 
failure processes was achieved using a factor-cluster analysis. After the 
detection of the failure processes, the contingencies between failure processes 
and firm countries of origin and exporting behaviour were studied. 
 
Study 3 design 
 
The data in Study 3 originated from the Amadeus database and concerned old 
manufacturing firms (at least ten years old at the time of declaring bankruptcy) 
from different European countries. The sample consisted of 1,235 firms and the 
countries with the highest number of cases represented were Italy, France, 
Romania, Spain and Hungary. All firms belonged to NACE C – the manufac-
turing industry, and as with Study 2, such a limitation was necessary to avoid a 
sectoral impact on the results. 
Study 3 used two different study designs. First, the failure processes were 
extracted using the factor-cluster analysis on the six financial variables from the 
Laitinen (1991) study. Secondly, these six financial variables were supple-
mented with five additional financial variables and the failure processes were 
again extracted using the factor-cluster analysis. After the extraction of the 
failure processes, the contingencies between the failure processes and firm 
country of origin, size and exporting behaviour were studied. 
 
Study 4 design 
 
The data in Study 4 encompassed failure causes obtained from court 
judgements. The dataset included all publicly available court judgements about 
bankruptcies at the moment of downloading. The strategy for detecting failure 
causes from the judgements was described earlier in this chapter. In total, 1,281 
court judgements, where failure causes had been brought out, were applied. In 
Study 4, a different taxonomy compared to Study 1 was applied. Namely, 
failure causes were depicted using a single nominal variable, namely either only 
internal, only external or both of those causes were noted in the specific court 
judgement. Such a taxonomy facilitates depicting whether the failure can be 
explained by voluntaristic, deterministic or integrative theories. Besides 
outlining the frequencies of the three different causes, a multinomial logistic 
regression was used to study how the failure causes (the nominal dependent 
variable) are interconnected with firm age and size.  
  
3. EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
  
4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1. Discussion of research questions 
 
In this chapter, the results of the analysis in answer to the research questions 
(RQs) and research sub-questions (RSQs) will be provided with a discussion in 
the light of available literature. The chapter is set up so that the answers to each 
RQ with its RSQs will be expounded and discussed separately. In Table 9, 
Table 11, Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15, all the results in response to the 
RSQs have been provided. The information in those tables has still been 
presented in a shortened form, meaning that the main findings have been 
presented, but the replication of all specific results from the Studies has been 
intentionally avoided. Therefore, concerning the details of the findings, the 
relevant Studies should be consulted. 
 
RQ1. Do different firm failure processes exist? 
 
All four Studies confirmed the findings in previous literature, that different 
failure processes exist (see Table 9). Studies 1, 2 and 3 used financial variables 
to detect failure processes. In Study 1, only factor analysis was used for that 
purpose, which resulted in 5 different processes for Finnish firms and 6 
different processes for Estonian firms. These processes describe remarkably 
different pathways of failure (also when comparing the two countries) and have 
been presented on pages 821–825 of Study 1. A limitation of Study 1 is that the 
datasets from both countries are small and dispersed over different sectors. 
Therefore, Studies 2 and 3 concentrate on a single sector – manufacturing firms. 
Studies 2 and 3 reveal two failure processes for old firms (see pages 69–71 in 
Study 3) and two to four failure processes for young micro firms (see pages 
1974–1978 in Study 2). 
There are no specific guidelines from previous studies on how to distinguish 
acute, gradual or chronic failure processes. This is especially topical in the case 
of (very) young firms, as for such firms, it is not possible to view many 
consecutive pre-failure years. In the case of the acute failure process, failure 
prediction using information from annual reports is difficult, as for this process, 
financial ratio values do not signal problems one year before failure, or they 
obtain poor values only in the last year before failure (see Laitinen 1991). In the 
case of the gradual failure process, the decline can be followed during several 
pre-failure years (Laitinen 1991). This decline has mostly been portrayed by 
reducing profitability (see Laitinen 1991, D’Aveni 1989), but the values other 
financial ratios can worsen as well. The changes in some other ratios are at least 
partly caused by falling profitability. For instance, earning losses ceteris 
paribus reduces a firm’s equity. 
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In the case of the chronic failure process, serious problems are observable 
through financial ratios for multiple pre-failure years (Laitinen 1991). When 
analysing the results of Studies 2 and 3, the processes detected have been 
classified into three aforementioned types of processes, i.e. acute, gradual and 
chronic failure processes based on the following motivation (see also Table 10 
for the summary of the categorized processes from Studies 2 and 3). 
In Study 227, four age groups of firms have been studied separately. In the 
case of 3-year-old firms, four failure processes were detected. In Study 2, these 
processes have been categorized as one gradual failure process (Process 3.2), 
two acute failure processes (Processes 3.1 and 3.3) and one chronic failure 
process (Process 3.4). In the case of the gradual failure process 3.2, a 
profitability, liquidity and solidity drop was observed during the two pre-failure 
years studied. In the case of acute failure processes 3.1 and 3.3, financial ratios 
either do not reflect negative developments during pre-failure years or they 
appear only in the pre-failure year t-1. In the case of acute failure process 3.3, 
firms witness high growth with the help of substantially increasing debt, which 
in turn is not characteristic of acute failure process 3.1. Process 3.4 clearly 
reflects a firm with very poor performance throughout its lifetime. 
In the case of 4-year-old firms, four processes were detected. In Study 2, 
these processes have been categorized as: gradual failure processes 4.1 and 4.4, 
acute failure process 4.2 and chronic failure process 4.3. In the case of gradual 
failure processes 4.1 and 4.4, most of the financial ratios drop during the three 
years studied. In the case of gradual failure process 4.4, firms witness high 
growth with the help of substantially increasing debt, which in turn is not 
characteristic of acute failure process 4.1. In the case of acute failure process 
4.2, values of some financial ratios worsen, but are still high, and others do not 
worsen at all. In the case of chronic failure process 4.3, financial ratios have 
very poor values throughout three years. 
In the case of 5- and 6-year-old firms, the two processes detected in the case 
of both firm groups have been classified as gradual failure processes. This is 
mainly motivated by the fact that profitability, liquidity and solidity for those 
processes become worse from year to year during their pre-failure life cycle. In 
the case of gradual failure processes 5.1 and 5.2 for 5-year-old firms and 
gradual failure processes 6.1 and 6.2 for 6-year-old firms, profitability is 
negative for the two pre-failure years, but for the preceding years it is either 
zero or positive (except for Process 6.1, in the case of which the profitability is 
negative (–0.6%) also for t-3 year). 
In Study 328, the two processes detected in the case of both study designs 
applied have been classified as gradual failure processes. This is mainly 
motivated by the fact that profitability, liquidity and solidity for those processes 
                                                 
27 See the pre-failure values of financial variables for different failure processes of 3-, 4-, 5- and 
6-year-old firms on pages 1976–1977 in Study 2. 
28 See the pre-failure values of financial variables for different failure processes of old firms on 
pages 316–317 in Study 2. 
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become worse from year to year during the five pre-failure years studied. The 
two gradual failure processes detected in the case of both study designs applied 
in Study 3 are characterized by negative profitability for two years before 
failure (except for process 2.2, in the case of which it is slightly positive in 
period t-2, i.e. 0.7%). 
 
Table 10. Failure processes and their shares detected in Studies 2 and 3 
 
Firm group Number 
of 
processes 
Acute 
failure 
processes 
Gradual failure 
processes 
Chronic 
failure 
processes 
3-year-old 4 2 processes 
(19.4% and 
14.8%) 
1 process (59.4%) 1 process 
(6.4%) 
4-year-old 4 1 process 
(17.9%) 
2 processes (31.3% 
and 37.3%) 
1 process 
(13.5%) 
5-year-old 2 None 2 processes (45.0% 
and 55.0%) 
None 
6-year-old 2 None 2 processes (36.2% 
and 63.8%) 
None 
At least 10-year-
old (design 1) 
2 None 2 processes (36.0% 
and 64.0%) 
None 
At least 10-year-
old (design 2) 
2 None 2 processes (56.5% 
and 43.5%) 
None 
Source: compiled by the author using the results in Studies 2 and 3. 
Note: the percentages reflect the shares of respective processes in the firm groups. 
 
In Study 129, the firms originate from different sectors, although in both 
countries (Finland and Estonia) 32 firms out of 70 are manufacturing firms. The 
thesis author additionally analysed the dataset used for Study 1 and the 
following conclusions can be made. Unlike in Studies 2 and 3, the ages of firms 
in Study 1 are different across the two studied countries (i.e. the median age of 
Estonian firms included is 7 and of Finnish firms 9). Therefore, Study 1 
provides some evidence about the age groups not used in Studies 2 and 3 – in 
Study 2 the oldest firm was (about) 6 years old and in Study 3 the youngest firm 
at least 10 years old. When specifically analysing the processes characteristic to 
manufacturing firms, then Finnish manufacturing firms predominately follow 
processes 2 and 330, whereas Estonian manufacturing firms predominately 
follow processes 2 and 431. Still, the number of manufacturing firms (32) in 
Study 1 is too small to draw any substantial conclusions and the use of only two 
periods (i.e. t-1 and t-2) does not enable unambiguous classification to the three 
types of failure processes. 
                                                 
29 See the pre-failure values of financial variables for different failure processes of Finnish and 
Estonian firms on pages 822–823 in Study 1. 
30 See page 822 in Study 1. 
31 See page 823 in Study 1. 
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Although the reasoning of classifying processes to acute, gradual and 
chronic failure types has been explained, it is still subject to limitations 
(especially in the case of very young firms for which only a few years can be 
studied). Namely, in case of some of the processes, the classification to the three 
types of failure processes might not be fully unambiguous. The classification to 
three types of processes has mainly been applied to enable easy characterization 
and comparison of the detected processes. 
It can be concluded that the most common failure process in all firm groups 
studied is gradual failure. Although based on the studies by Laitinen (1991) and 
D’Aveni (1989), it could have been expected that acute and chronic failure 
processes exist for old firms, this thesis showed that they do not emerge as the 
main processes. The evidence about the presence of three types of failure 
processes (acute, gradual and chronic) was found only in the case of very young 
firms (i.e. 3- and 4-year-old firms). 
The prevalence of gradually failing firms among older firms can be logically 
explained by two aspects. As older firms normally have established their market 
share, have easier access to capital (both, equity and debt) and are more 
experienced, their acute failure is quite unlikely except for extreme circum-
stances. In respect to the absence of chronic failure processes in the case of old 
firms, this might also be logical, as firms can witness lengthy unprofitable 
activities only in specific circumstances (e.g. if they have large reserves to 
employ and/or easy access to additional capital). As Studies 2 and 3 do not 
include Finnish (the country used in the Laitinen 1991 study) and US (the 
country used in the D’Aveni 1989 study) firms, the peculiarities of those 
countries could also explain the results obtained in those studies. Further, it is 
not possible to rule out the possibility that due to the small datasets in Laitinen 
(1991) and D’Aveni (1989), those studies do not reflect the whole population of 
firms very well. The findings in the thesis confirm the results in Argenti (1976) 
and Ooghe and de Prijcker (2008), as in those studies the failure of old firms 
was also depicted as a gradual process, although without substantial empirical 
proof to confirm such findings. The finding about the dominance of gradual 
failure processes for old firms also interconnects with the liability of 
obsolescence theory, which postulates that “firms become increasingly 
misaligned with their environments” (Henderson 1999: 281). The failure 
processes of young firms have also been commented under RQ4, as RSQ4.2.1 
considers their change in time. 
Study 4 showed that most commonly (43% of all firms) firm failure is 
explained by an integrative approach involving voluntaristic and deterministic 
theories (that is, internal and external causes simultaneously lead to the failure 
of a firm), which has been proposed, but not specifically tested in several 
studies (e.g. Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004, Amankwah-Amoah 2016). An 
interesting finding in Study 4 is that a large proportion of firm failures are still 
explained by only voluntaristic (31%, i.e. only internal causes) or only 
deterministic (26%, i.e. only external causes) theories. Study 1 indicated that 
failure processes extracted based on financial variables are mostly not 
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interconnected with specific failure causes. Namely, out of the two countries 
analysed, only in Finland did two causes out of five have significantly different 
mean values through the detected processes (see Study 1 pages 824–826). 
Specifically, firms that had witnessed very high pre-failure growth, had 
practically not been impacted by causes from the general environment, and 
firms with a low share of debt, but with very poor profitability during two pre-
failure years, had been much more impacted by deficient general management 
skills (see Study 1 pages 822, 824–826). 
 
RQ2. Do failure processes vary across countries? 
 
RQ2 considered an avenue of research not elaborated in previous studies. 
The results of the RSQs set for RQ2 can be followed in Table 11. In Study 1, 
data of matched firms from Finland and Estonia were used. For those 70 
matched firms from both countries, the failure processes were very different. 
The first indication of the differences was already provided by comparing the 
pre-failure financial variables and failure causes using statistical tests. More 
specifically, the majority of the pre-failure financial variables had significantly 
different median values, but such evidence was weaker in the case of the failure 
causes (see pages 815 and 817 in Study 1). The latter was reconfirmed using 
logistic regression analysis, which showed that Finnish and Estonian firms can 
be distinguished with a very high accuracy using the pre-failure financial 
variables (see pages 818–819 in Study 1). Based on the studies by Laitinen and 
Suvas (2013) and Altman et al. (2016), the presence of differences in the pre-
failure values of financial variables in Estonia and Finland could be assumed, 
but these studies still did not provide very detailed evidence in this respect. The 
logistic regression model was not so efficient in discriminating Estonian and 
Finnish firms based on failure causes (see page 820 in Study 1). As the Finnish 
and Estonian firms were matched pairs, the chi-square contingency test was 
conducted to find out whether processes detected in the different countries are 
interconnected. Such a proposition of interconnection was clearly rejected, and 
also, the Estonian and Finnish factor scores were not correlated (see pages 824–
825 in Study 1). 
Studies 2 and 3 use a more elaborate approach for the detection of failure 
processes than Study 1, namely the tandem factor-cluster analysis. Failure 
processes were detected from a large dataset including different European 
countries, making it possible to directly compare the representation of the same 
failure processes through various countries. Study 3 showed that the two failure 
processes detected (in the case of both study designs applied) can be very 
differently represented through various countries (see Table 12). There were 
situations, where a process was very infrequent in one country, but in turn in 
another country it was dominant. 
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In Study 2, a similar finding was reached as in Study 3, that failure processes 
can be very differently represented in the countries studied (only with the 
exception of 5-year-old firms; see Table 12). As almost no cases from common 
law countries were present in the dataset, a comparison between civil and 
common law countries could not be made in Studies 2 and 3. 
 
Table 12. Minimum and maximum shares of processes detected in Studies 2 and 3 
across countries 
 
Firm group Min(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
χ2 test 
p-value 
3-year-old 
firms 
Process 3.1 Process 3.2 Process 3.3 Process 3.4 0.000 10 28 42 65 6 32 3 15 
4-year-old 
firms 
Process 4.1 Process 4.2 Process 4.3 Process 4.4 0.000 10 54 5 30 10 20 8 60 
Firm group Min (%) Max (%) Min (%) Max (%) χ
2 test 
p-value 
5-year-old 
firms 
Process 5.1 Process 5.2 0.186 30 51 49 70 
6-year-old 
firms 
Process 6.1 Process 6.2 0.000 10 75 25 90 
At least 
10-year-
old firms 
(design 1) 
Process 1.1 Process 1.2 
0.000 6 71 29 94 
At least 
10-year-
old firms 
(design 2) 
Process 2.1 Process 2.2 
0.000 33 74 26 67 
Source: compiled by the author using the results in the Studies. 
Note: “Min (%)” indicates the minimum share of specific process in countries studied 
and “Max (%)” indicates the maximum share of specific process in countries studied. 
“χ2 test p-value” indicates whether the processes have significantly different association 
with countries studied. Only countries where all processes were represented have been 
included in the analysis. 
 
RQ3. Do failure processes vary with firm size? 
 
Only Studies 3 and 4 viewed directly the interconnection of failure processes 
with size (see results in Table 13). Still, in Study 1, size has been applied when 
extracting the failure processes, and therefore, the descriptive statistics provide 
some evidence of the different size distributions of firms following different 
processes in Finland and Estonia. In Study 3, three size groups were 
distinguished, namely micro firms, small firms and medium-large firms, the 
latter as one group because only a few cases of large firms were available. In 
Study 3 it was shown that different size groups can be interconnected with 
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different failure processes, but such an association was not strong (see page 318 
in Study 3). 
 
Table 13. Results of RSQs under RQ3 
 
RQ3. Do failure processes vary 
with firm size? 
Result 
Study 3
RSQ3.3.1. Do extracted failure 
processes (based on two different 
study designs applying financial 
variables) differ across size groups 
for old (at least 10-year-old) 
European manufacturing firms? 
Yes in the case of both study designs. See 
pages 72 and 75 in Study 3 for both study 
designs applied. 
Study 4
RSQ3.4.1. How does the likelihood 
of following different failure 
processes (based on non-financial 
variables, i.e. failure causes reflecting 
the deterministic, voluntaristic and 
integrative theories) in Estonia 
change with firm size? 
With an increase in firm size, the likelihood 
that a firm fails because of only internal 
reasons decreases, but the likelihood that a 
firm fails because of both internal and 
external reasons increases. The likelihood of 
failing because of only external reasons is not 
affected by firm size. See pages 50–51 and 
55 in Study 4. 
Source: compiled by the author using the results in the Studies. 
 
Study 4 (see page 51) showed that larger firms are less likely to fail due to 
internal reasons alone, which is an expected result, since the management of 
larger firms is often more experienced, which in turn decreases the possibility of 
single one-man errors to have a crucial effect on firm faith (see Aldrich and 
Auster 1986: 182–183). In turn, the likelihood of failing due to both problems, 
internal and external existing together, increases with firm size (see page 51 in 
Study 4). Therefore, for a large firm to fail, normally multiple problems (both, 
internal and external) must accumulate to become fatal. There is no significant 
relationship between firm size and failing due to external reasons alone (see 
page 51 in Study 4). This indicates that negative external developments (e.g. 
changes in laws, bankruptcy of a cooperation partner) can be similarly fatal for 
firms in different size categories. The interconnections between firm size and 
failure causes have been additionally commented on in Study 4. 
 
RQ4. Do failure processes vary with firm age? 
 
Interconnections between firm age and failure processes were considered in 
Studies 2 and 4 (see Table 14). Study 3 considered firms at least 10 years old at 
the moment of bankruptcy irrespective of their actual age, and in Study 1, the 
interconnections between the detected processes and age were not studied. 
 
145
Table 14. Results of RSQs under RQ4 
 
RQ4. Do failure processes vary 
with firm age? 
Result 
Study 2
RSQ4.2.1. How do the number 
and types of failure processes 
change with a growth in age for 
young manufacturing micro firms 
in Europe? 
The number of failure processes decreases with 
firm age. Namely, the 3- and 4-year-old firms 
are characterized by four different processes 
and 5 and 6-year-old firms by two different 
processes. In the case of 5- and 6-year-old 
firms, only gradual failure processes were 
detected, but in the case of 3- and 4-year-old 
firms all three types of processes are present 
(chronic, gradual and acute failure). See pages 
1974–1978 in Study 2. 
Study 4
RSQ4.4.1. How does the 
likelihood of following different 
failure processes (based on non-
financial variables, i.e. failure 
causes reflecting the 
deterministic, voluntaristic and 
integrative theories) in Estonia 
change with firm age? 
With an increase in firm age, the likelihood that 
a firm fails due to external reasons alone 
increases. The likelihood of failing due to 
internal reasons alone or by both internal and 
external reasons is not affected by firm age. See 
pages 50–51 and 55 in Study 4. 
Source: compiled by the author using the results in the Studies. 
 
Study 2 showed that with an increase in age, young firms are characterized 
by a smaller number of different failure processes. Namely, the 3- and 4-year-
old firms are characterized by four different processes, but 5- and 6-year-old 
firms by two different processes. Moreover, when all three types of processes 
(i.e. acute, gradual and chronic failure) were present in the case of 3- and 4-
year-old firms, then in the case of 5- and 6-year-old firms only gradual failure 
processes were detected. This finding connects with the liability of adolescence 
theory. Namely, adolescent firms32 can have enough initial resources like capital 
(Henderson 1999) and establish relationships with different stakeholders like 
clients and creditors (Brüderl and Schüssler 1990); therefore, witnessing a 
“honeymoon period” (Fichman and Levinthal 1991). The finding itself is also 
logical, as young firms normally cannot sustain a lengthy period of negative 
profitability. Therefore, also taking into account the findings about old firms, it 
can be postulated that liabilities of adolescence and obsolescence are mainly 
characterized by gradual failure processes, whereas the liability of newness can 
be characterized by different failure processes – acute, gradual and chronic 
failure processes. 
                                                 
32 The 5- and 6-year-old firms in Study 2. 
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Study 4 (see page 51) showed that firm age is interconnected with the 
likelihood to fail due to external reasons alone. Therefore, for old experienced 
firms the main reason for failure is some unforeseen development in the 
external environment. This interconnects with Aldrich and Auster (1986: 171), 
who postulate that with aging, firms are “developing attachments and 
dependencies that constrain their action”. A similarly interesting finding is the 
fact that there is no interconnection between firm age and the likelihood to fail 
due to internal reasons alone, or internal and external reasons combined (see 
page 51 in Study 4). The interconnections of firm age and failure causes have 
been additionally commented on in Study 4. 
 
RQ5. Do failure processes vary between exporting and non-exporting 
firms? 
 
The interconnection of failure processes and firm export behaviour has so far 
not been studied. Studies 2 and 3 outlined that exporting and non-exporting 
firms do not follow different failure processes (see Table 15). 
 
Table 15. Results of RSQs under RQ5 
 
RQ5. Do failure processes vary between exporting 
and non-exporting firms? 
Result 
Study 2
RSQ5.2.1. Do the extracted failure processes differ 
between young European manufacturing micro firms 
(grouped as 3-, 4-, 5- and 6-year-old firms) engaged in 
exporting and not engaged in exporting? 
No for all age groups of 
young firms. For the 
specific results across all 
age groups of young firms 
see pages 1978–1980 in 
Study 2. 
Study 3
RSQ5.3.1. Do extracted failure processes (based on 
two different study designs applying financial 
variables) differ between old (at least 10-year-old) 
European manufacturing firms engaged in exporting 
and not engaged in exporting? 
No in the case of both study 
designs. See pages 72 and 
75 in Study 3 for both study 
designs applied. 
Source: compiled by the author using the results in the Studies. 
 
Exporting firms have been noted as having higher survival possibilities than 
non-exporters, which besides diversification of target markets could be 
explained by their higher productivity compared to non-exporting firms 
(Bernard and Wagner 1997, Wagner 2012). In turn, in the case of profitability, 
Wagner (2012: 253) concluded in a thorough literature review that “results 
differ widely across studies” and “a big picture has not emerged”. This thesis 
indicates that exporting and non-exporting firms that become bankrupt are not 
associated with some specific failure processes. Therefore, it is possible to 
hypothesize that for exporters and non-exporters becoming bankrupt, pre-failure 
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performance does not differ. Still, in Studies 2 and 3 a simple measure to 
portray internationalization was applied. Namely, whether a firm during the pre-
failure period had been exporting at least for one year. Therefore, in future 
studies more elaborate measures of firm exporting behaviour should be applied. 
 
4.2. Practical implications 
 
The results of the thesis offer several practical implications for managers of 
firms, people involved in crediting or credit scoring, trustees, judges and policy 
makers. As different target groups can benefit from many of the implications, 
they will be presented as a list, in many cases without specifically denoting the 
target group(s). The specific implications have also been presented in each 
Study and here they will mainly be brought out in a consolidated form. 
 
1. In general, bankruptcy models could be implemented in the case of young 
and old manufacturing firms. Gradual failure processes dominate in the 
case of all firm groups applied, which make the prediction of bankruptcy 
possible. Namely, in the case of the gradual failure process, the step-by-
step decline in the values of financial ratios (i.e. profitability, liquidity, 
solidity and productivity ratios) can be followed and many of them obtain 
poor values already two years before bankruptcy declaration. This 
implication is of course limited by the fact that it is also important to know 
how the healthy firms perform, which was not studied in this thesis. 
2. The thesis outlines the shares of the main failure processes (based on 
financial variables) and the breakdown of those processes across countries. 
This provides important input information for bankruptcy prediction model 
builders, as it outlines which variables and how exactly can signal potential 
future problems. Further, the prevalence of different failure processes 
across countries could reduce the possibility of successfully applying 
models specific to one country in another country. The question of the 
rationality of the creation of simple (e.g. logistic regression based) 
international bankruptcy prediction models can also arise when the 
financial variables applied in the prediction models behave differently 
across the countries included. 
3. In many groups of firms, negative equity is an important pre-failure issue. 
Such firms evidently do not comply with the requirements set in law 
(namely, the requirement that assets should exceed debt), thus better 
monitoring of such firms by state institutions could either avoid failures or 
reduce their negative consequences. As in the case of some failure 
processes, equity is negative for multiple pre-failure years, and firms are 
functioning with negative profitability and still involve additional debt, the 
question of whether such firms should have been liquidated before might 
arise during the insolvency proceedings. 
4. In many groups of young firms, they function with a very high leverage 
already from the beginning of their lifetime. This could point to the fact, 
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that equity capital is not easily accessible. In order to reduce the failure risk 
of newly founded firms, policy measures could be introduced or improved 
to provide firms with start-up capital. 
5. In Estonia, the probability of failure due only to external causes increases 
with firm age and is the most frequent cause for old firms. Therefore, 
avoiding specific external developments having a crucial impact on firm 
faith is especially topical for older firms. Therefore, managers of older 
firms could specifically map and monitor external risks as having 
potentially high impact on firm financial performance. For instance, the high 
dependence on single or low numbers of customers could be avoided, and in 
the case of credit sales, more guarantees could be requested or a plan of 
action could be established for potential changes in government regulations. 
6. In Estonia, the probabilities of failure due to internal causes alone or 
internal and external causes are high for small firms. Further, the 
probability of failing due to internal causes alone reduces with firm size. 
Therefore, small firms would benefit from more business consultancy 
during the earlier stages of their development. This could potentially point 
to the necessity of improving policy measures for small business 
consultancy or providing more widespread access to them, especially as 
small firms might not have resources to outsource them. 
 
4.3. Limitations of the thesis 
 
As common to research in the field of social science, this thesis is also not free 
from limitations. Here the limitations will be brought out as a list in random 
order, and so the position of specific limitations does not reflect their 
importance. 
 
1. Throughout this thesis, firm failure has been defined as bankruptcy (i.e. 
permanent insolvency declared at court). Such restriction of the definition 
enables comparability across different countries and makes it very clear to 
which population of firms the results of the thesis are applicable. Still, such 
a restriction leaves undisclosed the extent to which the results of the thesis 
are applicable to the other types of failure. Furthermore, for the empirical 
analysis it is not known whether firms have either gone through reorgani-
zation, the bankruptcy petition submission has been delayed or firms have 
renegotiated debt before declaring bankruptcy. 
2. In some of the Studies here, the sample size has not been large (i.e. Study 
1) and not spanned multiple countries (i.e. Study 4). These limitations can 
have at least some effect on how generalizable the results are. On the 
positive side, Study 4 uses the largest dataset among well-known studies 
detecting failure causes (see Chapter 1.2.2), which in fact are all also 
single-country studies. In addition, the sample size in Study 1 (70 firms 
from both, Finland and Estonia) is similar to those in Hambrick and 
D’Aveni (1988), D’Aveni (1989), Laitinen (1991), Moulton et al. (1996), 
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and Crutzen and van Caillie (2010), and therefore, it meets the previous 
standard in similar studies rather well. 
3. As already elaborated in Chapter 2, court judgements as a source of 
bankruptcy causes, especially in a very detailed form, have limitations. 
Therefore, this limitation in turn hampers the use of a very detailed 
taxonomy. The study of failure causes also suffers from a classical 
limitation that is common to all causality studies. Namely, how to detect 
the actual cause of an event without errors. Therefore, the results of the 
research sub-questions seeking to explain failure causes should not be 
considered as “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”, but 
instead “failure causes presented by trustees”. 
4. This thesis is strongly exploratory in nature. This is to some extent 
connected to the fact that the available literature about failure processes is 
scant and fragmented. Therefore, the focus in the thesis has been set on 
empirically studying major research gaps in the available literature. The 
thesis does not specifically seek to develop a novel theory and test it 
afterwards. Still, several research gaps and the study designs directed to 
fulfil them in this thesis are well motivated with the available theoretical 
knowledge. 
 
4.4. Future research directions 
 
This thesis consolidates only the first efforts to offer an international 
perspective on the taxonomy of failure processes. The thesis author would like 
to state some valuable avenues of research that could be focused on in the 
future. As with the limitations, the list of future research directions will be 
presented in a random order. 
 
1. It would be beneficial to study failure processes over a larger geographical 
span, as this thesis includes only European Union countries, and even not 
all of them. For instance, it would be interesting to study, how firms fail in 
different countries on American and Asian continents. 
2. An important question not disclosed in this thesis is “why” the failure 
processes (extracted based on financial variables) differ across countries. 
Namely, for instance what causes a specific failure process to dominate in 
one country and be a rarity in another. Obviously, everything concerning 
causality is a very difficult research task to fulfil, and would probably 
demand a whole separate thesis. 
3. In the thesis, the Studies (as almost all literature in the area) actually use 
lengthy intervals between points of time (i.e. one year intervals as 
consecutive annual reports are being used) or failure causes coded to 
describe the whole pre-failure period. Future studies seeking novelties would 
benefit from data focusing on shorter time intervals (e.g. monthly data). 
4. The modelling of failure processes would benefit from a larger variety of 
financial variables, as through Amadeus only balance sheets and income 
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statements were available. Although some cash flows can be outlined 
based on balance sheet and income statement information, future studies 
would benefit from the availability of cash flow statement information. 
5. An important area of research to develop is the manager (with his or her 
different characteristics) and the decision-making process in the failure 
process. Indeed, this domain has received considerable attention in various 
streams of literature, but the context of a micro firm makes it possible to 
look into a specific situation, namely the case of a single manager 
responsible for all the firm’s activities. This facilitates the use of a large set 
of variables, as there is only one certain person responsible for the mistakes 
made in the business process. 
6. Failure processes is a topic not developed as a mainstream area in other 
streams of literature like internationalization. Therefore, such areas would 
benefit from similar studies. In fact, the thesis author is involved in a 
lengthy project named “A holistic process perspective of export patterns: 
theory development and empirical evidence” from year 2016. One of the 
objectives of the project is to focus on failure in exporting, and therefore, 
the knowledge obtained when writing the thesis can very well be tested in 
another avenue of research. 
 
4.5. Conclusion of the thesis 
 
The objective of the thesis was to model firm failure processes using financial 
and non-financial variables. The objective was achieved by setting 5 research 
questions and 18 research sub-questions, which were all addressed via empirical 
analysis. First, this thesis outlined different failure processes based on financial 
variables for similar old or young firms, but also for carefully matched firms 
from different countries. Therefore, in various domains of detecting firm failure 
processes, this thesis conducted pilot analyses. The thesis showed that in 
different countries, firms can follow various failure processes. 
Firm failure processes are different for firms in different size and age 
categories. This aspect was proven by applying both failure processes extracted 
using financial variables and failure causes. With growth in age, the number of 
different failure processes firms are subject to reduces, and the failure processes 
symbolizing gradual failure start to dominate. Unlike in past studies, old firms 
are not characterized by processes resembling either acute or chronic failure. 
Firm failure processes extracted based on financial variables do not associate 
differently with exporting and non-exporting firms. 
While firms most commonly bankrupt in Estonia because of the combination 
of internal and external causes, providing support for the integrative theory of 
failure causes, such a finding does not apply in the case of all sizes and ages of 
firms. Growth in firm size significantly increases the likelihood of failing due to 
internal and external causes combined, but in turn, decreases the likelihood of 
failing due to internal reasons alone. A growth in firm age increases the 
likelihood of failing due to external reasons alone.  
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APPENDIX 2. PROPOSITIONS FROM STUDIES FOR 
RESEARCH SUB-QUESTIONS 
 
RSQ Propositions in Studies 
RSQ1.1.1. Different failure processes exist 
RSQ1.1.2. Different failure processes exist 
RSQ1.1.3. No proposition set, purely exploratory 
RSQ1.1.4. No proposition set, purely exploratory 
RSQ1.2.1. Different failure processes exist 
RSQ1.3.1. Different failure processes exist 
RSQ1.4.1. Each of the three theoretical streams proposes its dominance 
RSQ2.1.1. Processes differ between Finland and Estonia 
RSQ2.1.2. Processes differ between Finland and Estonia 
RSQ2.1.3. Processes differ between Finland and Estonia 
RSQ2.2.1. Failure processes differ through countries 
RSQ2.3.1. Failure processes differ through countries 
RSQ3.3.1. Failure processes differ through size groups 
RSQ3.4.1. With firm size increase, the likelihood of failing because of internal 
reasons reduces, internal&external reasons increases and external 
reasons are not affected 
RSQ4.2.1. The number of failure processes varies with firms’ age 
RSQ4.4.1. With firm age increase, the likelihood of failing because of internal 
reasons reduces, external reasons increases and internal&external 
reasons are not affected 
RSQ5.2.1. Failure processes differ through exporting and non-exporting firms 
RSQ5.3.1. Failure processes differ through exporting and non-exporting firms 
Source: compiled by the author based on the Studies. See further: Study 1: 813; 
Study 2: 1967-1970; Study 3: 311-313; Study 4: 46-48. 
Note: Appendix 2 presents propositions for all RSQs. These propositions exactly 
replicate the hypotheses set in the Studies (see also Appendix 1). The motivation for 
each proposition can be followed in the specific Studies. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
 
Ettevõtete ebaõnnestumise protsesse iseloomustavad 
tunnused rahvusvahelises kontekstis 
 
Töö aktuaalsus 
 
Ettevõtteid tekib ja lõpetab tegevuse pidevalt, mistõttu on ettevõtete eba-
õnnestumise protsesside uurimine ajatu uurimisvaldkond, mille piiritlemisel on 
oluline, kuidas ebaõnnestumist defineerida. Kui ebaõnnestumise mõiste 
kitsendada pankrotiga, siis selle uurimine on kiirelt arenenud alates 1960. 
aastatest. Alates varasematest olulisematest teadustöödest (näiteks Beaver 1966, 
Altman 1968) on väga paljud uuringud käsitlenud pankroti prognoosimist, kuid 
mõned teised ebaõnnestumise aspektid (näiteks miks ettevõtted ebaõnnestuvad 
ja kuidas see kajastub ettevõtete finantsnäitajates) on oluliselt vähem tähelepanu 
pälvinud. 
Dissertatsiooni peamine uudsus seisneb ettevõtete ebaõnnestumise 
protsesside väheuuritud aspektide käsitlemises, milledeks on näiteks eba-
õnnestumise protsesside rahvusvaheline võrdlus ning nende muutumine seoses 
ettevõtete vanuse ja suurusega. Täpsemalt on töö olulist panust ebaõnnestumise 
protsesse käsitlevasse teaduskirjandusse kirjeldatud alapunktides „Kirjanduse 
ülevaade ja uurimislüngad“ ning „Töö peamised tulemused“. 
 
Töö eesmärk ning uurimisülesanded 
 
Dissertatsiooni eesmärgiks on luua rahvusvahelises kontekstis täiendavat 
teadmust ettevõtete ebaõnnestumise protsesse iseloomustavate tunnuste 
kohta, kasutades selleks finants- ja mittefinantsinäitajaid33. Ebaõnnestumise 
protsessina käsitletakse dissertatsioonis pankrotini (st. kohtu poolt välja 
kuulutatud püsiva maksejõuetuseni) viivat teekonda, mille puhul vaadeldakse 
nii küsimusi „miks“ (ebaõnnestumise põhjuseid) kui ka „kuidas“ (finants-
näitajate muutumist ebaõnnestumise protsessis). Teekonna all on töös mõeldud 
kas ettevõtte kogu eluiga või teatud arvu järjestikusi aastaid enne pankroti 
väljakuulutamist. 
Töö eesmärgi saavutamiseks on püstitatud järgnevad uurimisülesanded: 
1. Sünteesida teaduskirjandusest ettevõtte ebaõnnestumise ja ebaõnnestumise 
protsessi mõisteid. 
2. Sünteesida ettevõtete ebaõnnestumise protsessese käsitleva teaduskirjanduse 
teoreetilisi aluseid, uurimismetodoloogiaid ning tulemusi, pöörates 
täiendavalt tähelepanu põhjustele ja finantsnäitajatele ebaõnnestumise 
protsessis. 
                                                 
33 Finantsnäitajad on töös peamiselt finantssuhtarvud ning bilansi ja kasumiaruande kirjete 
muudud. Mittefinantsnäitajad on ebaõnnestumise põhjused. 
162
87 
3. Tuua varasema teaduskirjanduse põhjal välja uurimislüngad. 
4. Tuginedes varasemale ebaõnnestumise protsesse käsitlenud teadus-
kirjandusele, vastava kirjanduse põhjal tuvastatud uurimislünkadele ning 
autori poolt avaldatud teadusartiklitele, sõnastada (alam-)uurimisküsimused. 
5. Valida (alam-)uurimisküsimustele vastamiseks sobiv uurimismetodoloogia. 
6. Esitada dissertatsiooni osaks olevad autori poolt varem avaldatud 
teadusartiklid, leidmaks vastused (alam-)uurimisküsimustele ning täitmaks 
tuvastatud uurimislüngad. 
7. Summeerida ja diskuteerida (alam-)uurimisküsimustele leitud vastuseid ja 
esitada tööl põhinevad praktilised soovitused, töö piirangud ning ette-
panekud edasisteks uuringuteks. 
 
Töö struktuur ja töö osaks olevad teadusartiklid 
 
Töö põhineb järgneval neljal avaldatud teadusartiklil: 
1. Laitinen, E.K., Lukason, O. (2014) Do firm failure processes differ across 
countries: evidence from Finland and Estonia. Journal of Business 
Economics and Management, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp. 810–832. (Artikkel 1) 
2. Lukason, O., Laitinen, E.K., Suvas, A. (2016) Failure processes of young 
manufacturing micro firms in Europe. Management Decision, Vol. 54, No. 
8, 1966–1985. (Artikkel 2) 
3. Lukason, O., Laitinen, E.K. (2016) Failure processes of old manufacturing 
firms in different European countries. Investment Management and 
Financial Innovations, Vol. 13, No. 2, 310–321. (Artikkel 3) 
4. Lukason, O., Hoffman, R.C. (2015) Firm failure causes: a population level 
study. Problems and Perspectives in Management, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 45–
55. (Artikkel 4) 
 
Töö koosneb sissejuhatusest ning neljast peatükist. Esimeses peatükis 
käsitletakse varasemat teemakohast teaduskirjandust ning tuuakse ära (alam-) 
uurimisküsimused. Alapunkt 1.1 keskendub ebaõnnestumise, püsiva makse-
jõuetuse ning pankroti mõistetele. Alapunkt 1.2 käsitleb ettevõtete eba-
õnnestumise protsesse ning jaguneb kolmeks osaks. Alapunkt 1.2.1 käsitleb 
ebaõnnestumise protsessi mõistet ning varasemaid ebaõnnestumise protsesse 
tuvastanud teadustöid. Alapunkt 1.2.2 käsitleb spetsiifiliselt ebaõnnestumise 
põhjuseid ning alapunkt 1.2.3 finantsnäitajate muutumist ebaõnnestumise 
protsessis. Alapunktis 1.3 tuuakse ära (alam-)uurimisküsimused ning nende 
seosed uuringute ning uurimislünkadega. Peatükis 2 kirjeldatakse töös 
kasutatavaid andmeid ja meetodeid. Peatükk 3 koosneb töö osaks olevatest 
varem avaldatud teadusartiklitest. Viimane peatükk 4 jaguneb neljaks osaks. 
Alapunktis 4.1 esitatakse kõigi (alam-)uurimisküsimuste vastused ning 
diskuteeritakse tulemusi olemasoleva teaduskirjanduse taustal. Alapunktides 
4.2, 4.3, 4.4 ja 4.5 esitatakse tööst tulenevad praktilised soovitused, töö 
piirangud, ettepanekud tulevasteks uuringuteks ning töö koondkokkuvõte. 
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Kirjanduse ülevaade ning uurimislüngad 
 
Käesolevas osas on toodud ettevõtete ebaõnnestumise alase kirjanduse analüüsi 
peamised tulemused, mille põhjal on sõnastatud uurimislüngad. Ettevõtte 
ebaõnnestumist on defineeritud väga erinevalt (Watson and Everett 1999, 
Pretorius 2009), kuid majandusarvestuse ja rahanduse valdkonna empiirilistes 
töödes kasutatakse ebaõnnestumiste uurimiseks ennekõike pankrotistunud 
ettevõtete andmeid (Balcaen ja Ooghe 2006). Pankrotistunud ettevõtete andmete 
kasutamise kasuks räägivad mitmed aspektid: 1) pankrotistunud ettevõtete 
puhul saab kindlalt öelda, et ettevõte on ebaõnnestunud (äriprotsessis pole 
suudetud tagada seda, et ettevõte oleks maksevõimeline); 2) ettevõtete 
pankrottide kohta on võimalik hankida informatsiooni kujul, kus on toodud ära 
vastava sündmuse kuupäev; 3) muude ebaõnnestumise definitsioonide korral on 
informatsiooni hankimine raskendatud (näiteks ettevõtte nõutava tulunormi 
kohta on võimalik informatsiooni hankida peamiselt küsitluste vahendusel); 4) 
muude ebaõnnestumise definitsioonide korral (näiteks ettevõtte kahjumlikkus 
või nõutava tulunormi mittesaavutamine) võib ettevõtte staatus ajas muutuda; 5) 
pankrotistunud ettevõtteid on võimalik riikide lõikes võrrelda; 6) erinevad 
ettevõtte ebaõnnestumise mudeleid esitavad teadustööd käsitlevad pankro-
tistumist ebaõnnestumise protsessi viimase etapina (näiteks Weitzel ja Jonsson 
1989, Ooghe ja de Prijcker 2008, Crutzen ja van Caillie 2008). Makse-
jõuetusmenetluse alustamiseks kasutatakse enamikes riikides rahavoo testi, 
millega hinnatakse suutmatust sissenõutavateks muutunud kohustusi tasuda, 
ning mõnedes riikides ka bilansitesti, tuvastamaks kas varasid on vähem kui 
kohustusi, kuid nendest kahest testist tuleks kindlasti eelistada esimest (Uhrig-
Homburg 2005, The World Bank 2001). 
Ebaõnnestumise protsessi on erinevad autorid käsitlenud mõnevõrra 
erinevalt, kuid kõik käsitlused sarnanevad vähemal või suuremal määral 
Crutzen ja van Caillie (2008: 301) käsitlusele, kelle poolt koostatud integreeriv 
ettevõtte ebaõnnestumise protsessi mudel näitas „kõikehõlmavalt ja 
dünaamiliselt, miks (ebaõnnestumise põhjused) ja kuidas (sündmuste ahel) 
ettevõtted ebaõnnestuvad“. Ebaõnnestumise protsesside kohta on esitatud 
mitmeid erinevatest etappidest koosnevaid kontseptuaalseid mudeleid. Näiteks 
Crutzen ja van Caillie (2008: 302) käsitlesid ebaõnnestumise protsessi 
koosnevana neljast etapist: 1) ainult ettevõtte siseselt nähtavate ebaõnnestumise 
põhjuste ilmnemine; 2) väliselt nähtavate ebaõnnestumise sümptomite 
ilmnemine; 3) hoiatussignaalide ilmnemine; 4) pankrot. Sarnased etapid on ära 
toodud ka Ooghe ja de Prijcker (2008: 229–233) poolt: 1) esialgsed puudu-
jäägid; 2) negatiivsed signaalid; 3) finantsilised tagajärjed; 4) pankrot. 
Ebaõnnestumise protsesside uurimise alguseks saab pidada Argenti (1976) 
monograafiat, kus tuvastati kolm erinevat ebaõnnestumise protsessi. Argenti 
(1976) kasutas kolme protsessi identifitseerimiseks põhjuseid, sümptomeid ning 
ettevõtte üldist seisundit (tervist) kirjeldavaid muutujaid. Argenti (1976) poolt 
tuvastatud protsessid olid: 1) noor ettevõte, mida kogu eluaja jooksul ise-
loomustavad kehvad majandustulemused; 2) ettevõte, mis oma eluaja jooksul 
164
89 
on üliedukas, kuid millele järgneb kiire ebaõnnestumine; 3) vana ettevõte, mis 
ebaõnnestub järk-järgult. Argenti (1976) töös toodud protsessid olid pigem 
kontseptuaalsed, mitte empiiriliselt valideeritud, mistõttu on Argenti (1976) 
tööd kritiseerinud juba tema kaasaegsed teadlased (näiteks Gold 1977). 
Argenti (1976) tööle järgnevad uurimused on küll metodoloogiliselt olnud 
rohkem põhjendatud, kuid on üksteisest märkimisväärselt erinenud, mida on ka 
järgnevalt kirjeldatud. Siinkohal esitatud kirjanduse ülevaade põhineb vald-
konna olulisemate empiiriliste tööde (Argenti 1976, D’Aveni 1989, Laitinen 
1991, Moulton et al. 1996, Ooghe ja de Prijcker 2008, Crutzen ja van Caillie, 
Wu 2010) analüüsil. Vastavad tööd lahkenvad selles osas, kas käsitletakse 
ainult „miks“ ettevõtted ebaõnnestuvad, ainult „kuidas“ ettevõtted eba-
õnnestuvad või mõlemat korraga. Osad tööd põhinevad juhtumanalüüsidel, 
teised on aga kasutanud suuremat ettevõtete kogumit, mis küll kõigis ülaltoodud 
töödes (v.a. Wu 2010) on jäänud alla 100 ettevõtte. Vastavad tööd vaatlevad 
peamiselt vanade ettevõtete elutsükli viimaseid aastaid. Need tööd, mis on 
vaadelnud erinevas vanuses ettevõtteid, on tavaliselt kirjeldanud teatud 
vanusegruppi (näiteks noor või vana ettevõtete) ainult ühe ebaõnnestumise 
protsessiga. Kui osad ülaltoodud töödest on kvalitatiivsed, siis teistes on 
protsesside tuvastamiseks kasutatud erinevaid statistilise andmeanalüüsi 
meetodeid (näiteks faktoranalüüs, klasternalüüs, erinevad masinõppe meetodid). 
Kõik ülaltoodud tööd on tuvastanud kaks kuni viis erinevat ebaõnnestumise 
protsessi, kuid nagu eelnevalt nimetatud, on vastavate teadustööde metodo-
loogia olnud väga erinev. 
Varasemaid ettevõtete ebaõnnestumise protsesse tuvastavaid empiirilisi töid 
iseloomustavad mitmed puudused. Esiteks on töödesse olnud üldjuhul kaasatud 
väga erinevad ettevõtted (näiteks eri suuruse, vanuse ja tegevusharulise 
kuuluvusega), mistõttu jääb selgusetuks, kas ja kui palju nimetatud erinevused 
tuvastatud protsesside sisu mõjutavad (Uurimislünk 1). Lisaks on viimases 
majandusaasta aruandes toodud aruandeperioodi lõpu ja pankroti välja-
kuulutamise vahele jääv aeg ettevõtete lõikes oluliselt varieerunud. Mõningates 
kontekstides on ettevõtete ebaõnnestumist väga vähe uuritud, nagu näiteks 
noored ettevõtted (Uurimislüngad 2 ja 3), ebaõnnestumise protsesside 
muutumine koos ettevõtete suurusega (Uurimislünk 4), ebaõnnestumise 
protsesside võrdlus riikide lõikes (Uurimislünk 5) ning eksportivate ja mitte-
eksportivate ettevõtete ebaõnnestumise protsesside võrdlemine (Uurimislünk 
6). Pole põhjalikult uuritud ka seda, kuidas on ettevõtete finantsnäitajaid 
kasutades tuvastatud ebaõnnestumise protsessid seotud ebaõnnestumise 
põhjustega (Uurimislünk 7). 
Teooriad lahkenvad selles osas, mis põhjustab ettevõtte ebaõnnestumise. 
Varasemad teooriad jagunevad voluntaristlikeks ja deterministlikeks, millest 
esimene seab esikohale ettevõtte sise- ja teine väliskeskkonnast tulenevad 
põhjused (Daily 1994, van Witteloostuijn 1998, Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004, 
Amankwah-Amoah 2016). Hilisemad teooriad tähtsustavad mõlema keskkonna 
rolli ettevõtte ebaõnnestumises, rõhutades seega integreeritud teooriat (Mellahi 
and Wilkinson 2004, Amankwah-Amoah 2016), kuigi ekstreemsetes olukor-
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dades peetakse võimalikuks ka voluntaristliku või deterministliku teooria 
kehtivust (Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004). Ettevõtete ebaõnnestumise põhjuseid 
on ennekõike uuritud staatiliselt (Crutzen ja van Caillie 2008), st. põhjuseid ei 
paigutata ajateljele, vaid tuvastatakse lihtsalt teatud põhjuse (mitte-)olemasolu. 
Spetsiifiliselt pankroti põhjuseid tuvastavaid empiirilisi uuringuid on vähe 
(Altman ja Narayanan 1997) ning need uuringud on erinenud nii metodoloogia 
kui ka tulemuste osas. Osad uuringud on leidnud, et sisemised ja välimised 
põhjused on sama olulised (Baldwin et al. 1997), kuid teised on tuvastanud 
sisemiste põhjuste suurema olulisuse (Hall 1992, Gaskill et al. 1993). Nimetatud 
uuringute puuduseks on see, et enamik neist ei käsitle põhjuste omavahelisi 
seoseid. Vastavates uuringutes on kasutatud nii pankrotihalduritelt kui ka 
ettevõtete juhtidelt või omanikelt pärinevat informatsiooni ebaõnnestumise 
põhjuste kohta. Samas pole siiani selget vastust, milline on ülaltoodud teooriate 
paikapidavus ettevõtete üldkogumis ning millised on nende seosed ettevõtete 
suuruse ja vanusega (Uurimislüngad 8 ja 9). 
Ettevõtete finantsnäitajate muutumise kohta ebaõnnestumise protsessis on 
koostatud mitmeid kontseptuaalseid mudeleid. Sarnased mudelid on välja 
pakkunud Laitinen (2005) ning Ooghe ja de Prijcker (2008), kelle seisukohalt 
algab ebaõnnestumine ebapiisava kasumi (või äritegevuse rahavoo) teenimisest, 
viies ettevõtte likviidsuse vähenemiseni, misjärel suurendavad ettevõtted 
kohustusi, jõudes seetõttu omakorda olukorrani, kus kohustusi ei suudeta enam 
täita. 
Ebaõnnestumise protsesside modelleerimiseks finantsnäitajaid kasutanud 
töödest on kõige põhjalikum Laitinen (1991) töö, kus esitati sarnaste 
investeerimisprojektide teoreetiline mudel, millesse oli kaasatud kuus 
finantsnäitajat: 1) varade kasumlikkust (rentaablust) väljendav suhtarv; 2) 
müügitulu ja varade suhtarv; 3) kohustuste ja varade suhtarv; 4) käibevara ja 
lühiajaliste kohustuste suhtarv; 5) traditsioonilise rahavoo (st. puhaskasumi ja 
amortisatsiooni summa) suhe müügitulusse; 6) varade kasvumäär. Vastavaid 
finantsnäitajaid faktoranalüüsis kasutades tuvastas Laitinen (1991) kolm 
erinevat ebaõnnestumise protsessi: 1) pikaajaliselt halbade finantsnäitajatega 
ettevõte (st. krooniline ebaõnnestuja); 2) järk-järguline ebaõnnestuja ehk järjest 
kehvemate finantsnäitajatega ettevõte; 3) väga kiiresti ebaõnnestuv ettevõte, 
mille pankrotile eelneva aasta finantsnäitajad ei pruugi üldse probleemidele 
viidata (st. akuutne ebaõnnestuja). Sarnasele tulemusele ebaõnnestumise 
tüüpide osas on jõudnud ka D’Aveni (1989). D’Aveni (1989) ja Laitinen (1991) 
töödes on ülaltoodud kolme ebaõnnestumise protsessi erinevused kõige 
paremini jälgitavad rentaablusnäitaja vahendusel. Vastavates töödes olid 
eelpoolnimetatud ebaõnnestumise tüüpide osakaalud järgnevad: 1) krooniline 
ebaõnnestuja – 51% D’Aveni (1989) ja 33% Laitinen (1991), 2) järk-järguline 
ebaõnnestuja – 39% D’Aveni (1989) ja 28% Laitinen (1991), 3) akuutne 
ebaõnnestuja – 10% D’Aveni (1989) ja 40% Laitinen (1991). Samas on 
mainitud autorite töödes kasutatud valimid olnud väga väikesed, mistõttu tekib 
küsimus, kas riikideüleses suures andmekogumis on kõik kolm protsessi 
esindatud ning nende osakaalud sarnased eelnevates töödes leituga. 
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Kuna Laitinen (1991) mudel sisaldab ainult kuut finantsnäitajat, siis on seda 
mudelit võimalik täiustada, lisades sellesse täiendavaid olulisi muutujaid 
(Uurimislünk 10). Näiteks lisades mudelisse müügitulu muudu, kulude muudu 
ning kohustuste muudu, mida on kirjanduses ebaõnnestumise protsessi 
seisukohalt oluliseks peetud (Beaver 1966, Ooghe ja de Prijcker 2008). Lisaks 
on võimalik mudelis lühi- ja pikaajalist maksevõimet vaadelda lähtudes 
Laitinen (1995) uuringust nii staatilises kui ka dünaamilises kontekstis. Seetõttu 
on töös ebaõnnestumise protsessi modellerimiseks välja toodud täiustatud 
mudel, mis sisaldab lisaks Laitinen (1991) töös ära toodud muutujatele ka 
eelnimetatud täiendusi. 
Kirjanduse ülevaate põhjal tuvastatud uurimislünkade täielik loetelu on 
järgnev: 
1. Kas sarnaste ettevõtete puhul eksisteerivad erinevad ebaõnnestumise 
protsessid (Uurimislünk 1)? 
2. Kas noorte ettevõte puhul eksisteerivad erinevad ebaõnnestumise protsessid 
(Uurimislünk 2) ning kuidas need protsessid muutuvad koos ettevõtte 
vanusega (Uurimislünk 3)? 
3. Kuidas ebaõnnestumise protsessid muutuvad koos ettevõtte suurusega 
(Uurimislünk 4)? 
4. Kas eri riikides läbivad ettevõtted erinevaid ebaõnnestumise protsesse 
(Uurimislünk 5)? 
5. Kas eksportivad ja mitte-eksportivad ettevõtted läbivad erinevaid 
ebaõnnestumise protsesse (Uurimislünk 6)? 
6. Kuidas finantsnäitajate põhjal tuvastatud ebaõnnestumise protsessid on 
seotud ebaõnnestumise põhjustega (Uurimislünk 7)? 
7. Kuidas on voluntaristlik, deterministlik ning integreeritud teooria seotud 
ettevõtete vanuse (Uurimislünk 8) ja suurusega (Uurimislünk 9)? 
8. Millised on ebaõnnestumise protsessid, kui nende tuvastamiseks kasutada 
varasemate uuringutega võrreldes suuremat hulka finantsnäitajaid 
(Uurimislünk 10)? 
 
Uurimisküsimused 
 
Kirjanduse ülevaate, uurimislünkade ning avaldatud artiklite põhjal on töös ära 
toodud viis uurimisküsimust, mis omakorda jagunevad kaheksateistkümneks 
alam-uurimisküsimuseks. Töös püstitatud uurimisküsimused on järgnevad: 
1. Kas erinevad ebaõnnestumise protsessid on olemas? 
2. Kas ebaõnnestumise protsessid erinevad riikide lõikes? 
3. Kas ebaõnnestumise protsessid muutuvad koos ettevõtete suurusega? 
4. Kas ebaõnnestumise protsessid muutuvad koos ettevõtete vanusega? 
5. Kas ebaõnnestumise protsessid erinevad eksportivate ja mitte-eksportivate 
ettevõtete lõikes? 
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Uurimisküsimuste, avaldatud artiklite ning uurimislünkade vahelised seosed 
on ära toodud järgnevas tabelis 134. 
 
Tabel 1. Töö uurimisküsimuste, artiklite ning uurimislünkade vahelised seosed 
 
Uurimisküsimus (UK) Artikkel, milles 
UK käsitlust 
leiab 
UK all käsitletavad 
uurimislüngad 
UK 1. Kas erinevad 
ebaõnnestumise protsessid on 
olemas? 
Artikkel 1, 
Artikkel 2, 
Artikkel 3, 
Artikkel 4 
Uurimislünk 1, 
Uurimislünk 2, 
Uurimislünk 7, 
Uurimislünk 10 
UK 2. Kas ebaõnnestumise 
protsessid erinevad riikide lõikes? 
Artikkel 1, 
Artikkel 2, 
Artikkel 3 
Uurimislünk 5 
UK 3. Kas ebaõnnestumise 
protsessid muutuvad koos 
ettevõtete suurusega? 
Artikkel 3, 
Artikkel 4 
Uurimislünk 4, 
Uurimislünk 9 
UK 4. Kas ebaõnnestumise 
protsessid muutuvad koos 
ettevõtete vanusega? 
Artikkel 2, 
Artikkel 4 
Uurimislünk 3, 
Uurimislünk 8 
UK 5. Kas ebaõnnestumise 
protsessid erinevad eksportivate ja 
mitte-eksportivate ettevõtete lõikes? 
Artikkel 2, 
Artikkel 3 
Uurimislünk 6 
Allikas: autori koostatud. 
 
Töö andmed ja meetodid 
 
Töö osaks olevad varem avaldatud teadusartiklid põhinevad kõik empiirilisel 
analüüsil, mille kokkuvõte on toodud tabelis 2. Artiklis 2 ja 3 on kasutatud 
Amadeusi andmebaasist pärinevaid erinevate Euroopa riikide ettevõtete 
finantsandmeid ning ebaõnnestumise protsessid on tuvastatud faktor- ja 
klasteranalüüsi kasutades. Artikkel 1 põhineb 70 Soome ja 70 Eesti ettevõtete 
nii finantsandmetel kui ka ebaõnnestumise põhjustel. Kahe riigi ettevõtted on 
kokku sobitatud (ing. k. matched), st. igale Soome ettevõttele on otsitud 
tegevusala, suuruse ja pankroti aja alusel võrdluseks sarnane Eesti ettevõte. 
Artikkel 4 põhineb ainult Eesti ettevõtete andmetel ning ebaõnnestumise 
põhjustel, mis pärinevad kohtulahenditest. 
Finantsnäitajatest on kasutatud nelja liiki suhtarve (lühi- ja pikaajalise 
maksevõime, rentaabluse ning efektiivsuse suhtarvud35), bilansi- ja kasumi-
aruandekirjete muutusid ning ettevõtte suuruse näitajaid, viimati nimetatuid küll 
ainult Artiklis 1. 
 
                                                 
34 Eestikeelse kokkuvõtte tabelite numeratsioon algab uuesti numbrist 1, st. ei jätkata 
ingliskeelsete tabelite numeratsiooni. 
35 Suhtarvugruppide ingliskeelsed nimed on: liquidity, solidity, profitability, activity/efficiency. 
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Tabel 2. Töös kasutatud andmed ja meetodid artiklite lõikes 
 
Artikkel (ja 
andmete liik) 
Andekogumi suurus ning 
kasutatud finantsnäitajate 
perioodid ja arv 
Kasutatud statistilise 
andmeanalüüsi meetodid 
Artikkel 1 
(finantsnäitajad 
ning ebaõnnestu-
mise põhjused) 
70 Soome ja 70 Eesti ettevõtet. 10 
erinevat finantsnäitajat 2 
ebaõnnestumisele eelneva 
perioodi kohta.  
Statistilised testid, 
korrelatsioonanalüüs, 
logistiline 
regressioonanalüüs, 
faktoranalüüs. 
Artikkel 2 (ainult 
finantsnäitajad) 
1216 Euroopa 
mikrotööstusettevõtet, mille eluea 
pikkus on olnud kas 3, 4, 5 või 6 
aastat. 11 erinevat finantsnäitajat 
1–4 ebaõnnestumisele eelneva 
perioodi kohta. 
Statistilised testid, 
faktoranalüüs, 
klasteranalüüs. 
Artikkel 3 (ainult 
finantsnäitajad) 
1235 Euroopa tööstusettevõtet, 
mille eluea pikkus on olnud 
vähemalt 10 aastat ning mis 
kuuluvad erinevatesse 
suurusegruppidesse. Sõltuvalt 
analüüsi püstitusest 6 või 11 
erinevat finantsnäitajat 5 
ebaõnnestumisele eelneva 
perioodi kohta. 
Statistilised testid, 
faktoranalüüs, 
klasteranalüüs. 
Artikkel 4 (ainult 
ebaõnnestumise 
põhjused) 
Finantsandmeid pole kasutatud.  Statistilised testid, multi-
nomiaalne logistiline 
regressioonanalüüs.  
Allikas: autori koostatud. 
 
Töö peamised tulemused 
 
Töö peamisi tulemusi on järgnevalt kommenteeritud uurimisküsimuste kaupa. 
 
Uurimisküsimus 1. Kas erinevad ebaõnnestumise protsessid on olemas? 
 
Kõik neli artiklit näitasid, et erinevad ebaõnnestumise protsessid on olemas. 
Artiklis 1 tuvastati Eesti ettevõtete osas kuus ja Soome ettevõtete osas viis 
erinevat ebaõnnestumise protsessi. Kuna Artikkel 1 sisaldas firmasid erinevatest 
sektoritest, siis Artiklitega 2 ja 3 võrreldavuse huvides on oluline rõhutada, et 
mõlema riigi tööstusettevõtteid iseloomustasid peamiselt kaks erinevat 
ebaõnnestumise protsessi. Eesti ettevõtete näitel finantsnäitajad kasutades 
tuvastatud ebaõnnestumise protsessid ei olnud seotud spetsiifiliste eba-
õnnestumiste põhjustega, kuid Soomes olid viiest põhjusest kaks seotud 
konkreetsete protsessidega. Artiklites 2 ja 3 tuvastatud ebaõnnestumise 
protsessid on koondatud tabelisse 3. 
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Tabel 3. Artiklites 2 ja 3 tuvastatud ebaõnnestumise protsessid (EP) 
 
Ettevõtete grupp Protsesside 
arv 
Akuutne 
EP 
Järk-järguline 
EP 
Krooniline 
EP 
3 aastat vanad 4 2 protsessi 
(19,4% ja 
14,8%) 
1 protsess (59,4%) 1 protsess 
(6,4%) 
4 aastat vanad 4 1 protsess 
(17,9%) 
2 protsessi (31,3% 
ja 37,3%) 
1 protsess 
(13,5%) 
5 aastat vanad 2 Puuduvad 2 protsessi (45,0% 
ja 55,0%) 
Puuduvad 
6 aastat vanad 2 Puuduvad 2 protsessi (36,2% 
ja 63,8%) 
Puuduvad 
Vanad (vähemalt 
10 aastat; 
muutujate 
komplekt 1) 
2 Puuduvad 2 protsessi (36,0% 
ja 64,0%) 
Puuduvad 
Vanad (vähemalt 
10 aastat; 
muutujate 
komplekt 2) 
2 Puuduvad 2 protsessi (56,5% 
ja 43,5%) 
Puuduvad 
Allikas: autori koostatud. Märkus: sulgudes on toodud vastava protsessi osakaal. 
 
Tabelist 3 on näha, et kõigis vanusegruppides domineerivad järk-järgulise 
ebaõnnestumise protsessid ning enamikes vanusegruppides akuutset ning 
kroonilist ebaõnnestumise protsessi esindatud ei ole. Selline tulemus vastandub 
selgelt varasemates töödes (D’Aveni 1989, Laitinen 1991) leitule. Järk-
järguliste protsesside puhul oli peaaegu kõigil juhtudel jälgitav kasutatud 
finantssuhtarvude väärtuste järk-järguline halvenemine pankrotile eelnevate 
aastate jooksul. Ebaõnnestumise põhjuste osas leiti töös, et 43% ettevõtetest 
ebaõnnestub sise- ja väliskeskkonna põhjuste koosmõjus, mistõttu leidis 
integreeritud teooria domineerimine kinnitust. Samas on ainult sisekeskkonnast 
ning ainult väliskeskkonnast tulenevate põhjuste tõttu ebaõnnestumine sage, 
vastavalt 31% ja 26%, mistõttu integreeritud teooria ei ole ebaõnnestumiste 
seletamisel siiski ülekaalukalt tähtsaim, nagu väideti Mellahi ja Wilkinson 
(2004) poolt. 
 
Uurimisküsimus 2. Kas ebaõnnestumise protsessid erinevad riikide lõikes? 
 
Artiklis 1 näidati Eesti ja Soome ettevõtete pankrotieelsete finantsnäitajate 
võrdlemisel statistiliste testide ning logistilise regressioonanalüüsiga, et 
ebaõnnestunud ettevõtete finantsnäitajad on kahe riigi lõikes väga erinevad. 
Samas ebaõnnestumise põhjuste osas kahe riigi lõikes nii suuri erinevusi ei 
esinenud. Kuigi ettevõtted olid analüüsis spetsiaalselt valitud paarid, siis 
iseloomustavad Soome ja Eesti ettevõtteid väga erinevad ebaõnnestumise 
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protsessid. Artiklis 2 ja 3 tuvastatud protsessid olid riikide lõikes väga erineva 
osakaaluga, mida on näidatud tabelis 4. 
 
Tabel 4. Erinevate protsesside minimaalsed ja maksimaalsed osakaalud eri riikides. 
 
Ettevõtete grupp Min
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
3 aastat vanad Protsess 3.1 Protsess 3.2 Protsess 3.3 Protsess 3.4 
10 28 42 65 6 32 3 15 
4 aastat vanad Protsess 4.1 Protsess 4.2 Protsess 4.3 Protsess 4.4 
10 54 5 30 10 20 8 60 
Ettevõtete grupp Min (%) Max (%) Min (%) Max (%) 
5 aastat vanad Protsess 5.1 Protsess 5.2 
30 51 49 70 
6 aastat vanad Protsess 6.1 Protsess 6.2 
10 75 25 90 
Vanad (vähemalt 
10 aastat vanad; 
muutujate 
komplekt 1) 
Protsess 1.1 Protsess 1.2 
6 71 29 94 
Vanad (vähemalt 
10 aastat vanad; 
muutujate 
komplekt 2) 
Protsess 2.1 Protsess 2.2 
33 74 26 67 
Allikas: autori koostatud. 
Märkus: Min ja Max tähendavad vastavalt vaadeldava protsessi minimaalselt ja 
maksimaalselt osakaalu analüüsi kaasatud riikides. Tabelis toodud protsesside numbrid 
pärinevad töö osaks olevatest teadusartiklitest. 
 
Uurimisküsimus 3. Kas ebaõnnestumise protsessid muutuvad koos ettevõtete 
suurusega? 
 
Uurimisküsimust 3 käsitleti Artiklites 3 ja 4. Artiklis 3 selgus, et eba-
õnnestumise protsessid võivad ettevõtete suuruse gruppide lõikes erineda. 
Väikesemaid ettevõtteid iseloomustavad rohkem sellised ebaõnnestumise 
protsessid, kus finantssuhtarvude väärtuste halvenemine on võrreldes suuremaid 
ettevõtteid iseloomustavate protsessidega kiirem. 
Artikkel 4 näitas, et ebaõnnestumine ainult sisekeskkonna põhjuste tõttu 
väheneb koos ettevõtte suuruse kasvuga. Samas sise- ja väliskeskkonna 
põhjuste koosmõju tõttu ebaõnnestumise puhul eksisteerib vastupidine seos, st. 
vastava põhjuse esinemistõenäosus kasvab koos ettevõtte suurusega. Ainult 
väliskeskkonnast tingitud põhjuste tõttu ebaõnnestumise ja ettevõtte suuruse 
vahel puudub statistiliselt oluline seos. 
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Uurimisküsimus 4. Kas ebaõnnestumise protsessid muutuvad koos ettevõtete 
vanusega? 
 
Uurimisküsimust 4 käsitleti otseselt ainult Artiklites 2 ja 4, kuigi teatud 
ealisi üldistusi on võimalik teha ka Artikleid 2 ja 3 koos vaadeldes. Kolme tüüpi 
ebaõnnestumise protsessid on iseloomulikud ainult väga noortele (3 ja 4 aasta 
pikkuse elueaga) ettevõtetele. Ettevõtete vanuse kasvades (5 ja 6 aasta pikkuse 
elueaga ettevõtted ning üle 10 aasta pikkuse elueaga ettevõtted) esinevad ainult 
järk-järgulise ebaõnnestumise protsessid. Seetõttu võib öelda, et ettevõtete 
sünnijärgsete probleemide teooria (ing. k. liability of newness theory) on 
kirjeldatud mitmete erinevate ebaõnnestumise protsessi tüüpidega, kuid 
noorukiea probleemide teooria (ing. k. liability of adolescence theory) ning 
vananemise probleemide teooria (ing. k. liability of obsolescence theory) on 
seotud ainult järk-järgulise ebaõnnestumise protsessidega. 
Artikkel 4 näitas, et ettevõtte vanuse kasvades suureneb tõenäosus 
ebaõnnestuda ainult väliskeskkonnast tulenevate põhjuste tõttu. Ainult 
sisekeskkonna põhjuste ning sise- ja väliskeskkonna põhjuste koosmõju tõttu 
ebaõnnestumise ning ettevõtte vanuse vahel puudub statistiliselt oluline seos. 
 
Uurimisküsimus 5. Kas ebaõnnestumise protsessid erinevad eksportivate ja 
mitte-eksportivate ettevõtete lõikes? 
 
Eksportivate ja mitte-eksportivate ettevõtete ning ebaõnnestumise 
protsesside vahelisi seoseid vaadeldi ainult Artiklites 2 ja 3, mille jaoks olid 
ettevõtete ekspordiandmed kättesaadavad. Mõlemad artiklid näitasid, et 
eksportivate ja mitte-eksportivate ettevõtete lõikes pole ebaõnnestumise 
protsessid erinevad. Seetõttu võib öelda, et kuigi eksportivate ja mitte-
eksportivate ettevõtete finantsnäitajate võrdluses on tuvastatud palju erinevusi 
(vaata Wagner 2012), nende ebaõnnestumine ei erine. 
 
Järgnevalt on kokkuvõtlikult esitatud töö peamine teaduslik uudsus. 
Võrreldes paljude varasemate töödega (näiteks D’Aveni 1989, Laitinen 1991, 
Laitinen et al. 2014) on analüüsi kaasatud ettevõtted omavahel rohkem 
võrreldavad. Näiteks on Artiklis 2 kasutatud ainult tööstussektori noorte 
mikroettevõtete andmeid, Artiklis 3 tööstussektori vanade (kõik vähemalt 10 
aastat vanad) ettevõtete andmeid ning Artiklis 3 omavahel sobitatud (ing. k. 
matched) Eesti ja Soome ettevõtete andmeid. Lisaks on kõigi Artiklitesse 2 ja 3 
kaasatud ettevõtete puhul pankroti väljakuulutamise ja pankrotieelse aasta-
aruande bilansipäeva vahelise perioodi pikkus 0,75–1,25 aastat. Nimetatud 
aspektid on tulemuste üldistamise seisukohalt ülimalt olulised. Näiteks kui 
ebaõnnestumise protsesside modelleerimisel kasutada viimases esitatud 
majandusaasta aruandes toodud informatsiooni, võib tekkida probleem, et mõne 
ettevõtte puhul peegeldab aruanne situatsiooni näiteks mõni kuu enne pankroti 
väljakuulutamist, aga teisel juhul on vastav näitaja näiteks kaks aastat. 
Lisaks eelnimetatud uuendustele käsitles töö mitmeid varasemas teadus-
kirjanduses väga vähe uuritud aspekte. Senini pole piisavalt tähelepanu 
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pööratud ebaõnnestumise protsesside rahvusvahelisele võrdlemisele ning 
puudub ka teadmus mõnede ettevõtete tüüpide ebaõnnestumise protsesside 
kohta. Näiteks on noorte ettevõtete ebaõnnestumist portreteeritud ühe 
spetsiifilise protsessiga (Argenti 1976, Ooghe ja de Prijcker 2008), kuid antud 
töö näitas, et sellistele ettevõtetele on tegelikult omased mitmed erinevad eba-
õnnestumise protsessid. Varasemates töödes otseselt käsitlemata valdkond on ka 
ebaõnnestumise protsesside seos ettevõtte vanusega. Artiklid 2 ja 3 näitasid, et 
ettevõtete vanuse kasvades iseloomustab neid väiksem arv erinevaid eba-
õnnestumise protsesse. Teaduskirjanduses polnud senini ka vastust, kas 
eksportivate ja mitte-eksportivate ettevõtete ebaõnnestumise protsessid 
erinevad. Artiklid 2 ja 3 näitasid, et ebaõnnestumise protsessid eksportivate 
ning mitte-eksportivate ettevõtete lõikes ei erine. Olulise uuendusena saab välja 
tuua ka selle, et Artiklis 4 näidati Eesti ettevõtete üldkogumile tuginedes, kuidas 
selgitavad eri vanuse ja suurusega ettevõtete ebaõnnestumist voluntaristlik, 
determinsitlik ning integreeritud teooria. Eelnev on oluline just seetõttu, et 
teaduskirjanduses (Mellahi ja Wilkinson 2004, Amankwah-Amoah 2016) on 
aastaid rõhutatud vastava teema empiirilise uurimise vajalikkust. 
 
Töö praktiline tähtsus 
 
Töö tulemuste põhjal on erinevatele sihtgruppidele (nagu näiteks krediidi-
analüütikud, krediidiriski mudelite koostajad, pankrotihaldurid, kohtunikud, 
seadusloojad) võimalik välja tuua mitmeid praktilisi soovitusi, mida on 
järgnevalt kirjeldatud: 
1. Töö tulemused näitasid, et eri riikides võivad domineerida erinevad 
ebaõnnestumise protsessid. Seetõttu ei pruugi ühe riigi andmete põhjal 
koostatud pankroti prognoosimise mudelid sobida kasutamiseks teises riigis. 
Kõrge klassifitseerimistäpsusega universaalsete (riikideüleste) pankroti 
prognoosimise mudelite koostamine lihtsate meetoditega (näiteks logistilise 
regressioonanalüüsiga) võib seega osutuda keerukaks. Samas on kõige 
suurema osakaaluga järk-järgulist ebaõnnestumist kirjeldavad protsessid, 
mistõttu pankroti prognoosimine on võimalik. 
2. Enamiku ebaõnnestumise protsesside puhul (nii noorte kui ka vanade 
ettevõtete lõikes) on omakapital mitu aastat enne pankroti väljakuulutamist 
negatiivne. Vanemate ettevõtete puhul tekib antud juhul küsimus, kas need 
ei oleks pidanud juba varem alustama saneerimis- või likvideerimis-
menetlust. Sellele aspektile saavad tähelepanu pöörata nii pankrotihaldurid 
pankrotimenetluses kui ka riiklikud äriregistrid ettevõtete omakapitalinõuete 
vastavuse kontrollil. Noorte ettevõtete puhul on suureks probleemiks vähene 
omakapital, mis võib viidata vajadusele alustavate ettevõtete starditoetuste 
süsteemi täiustada. 
3. Vanad ettevõtted ebaõnnestuvad kõige sagedamini väliskeskkonna põhjuste 
tõttu, seega need ettevõtted peaksid ebaõnnestumise vältimiseks just 
vastavaid riske maandama. Näiteks võiks vältida keskendumist väga 
väikesele hulgale klientidele, vältida liigset (tagatisteta) krediitmüüki (isegi 
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kauaaegsete koostööpartnerite korral) ning olla kursis oma valdkonda 
puudutava seadusandluse arengutega. 
4. Ainult sisekeskkonnast või nii sise- kui ka väliskeskkonnast korraga 
tulenevate põhjuste tõttu ebaõnnestumiste osakaal on kõrge just mikro- ja 
väikeettevõtete hulgas. Siinkohal on võimalik riigil parandada ettevõtlus-
nõustamise kättesaadavust vastava ettevõtete sihtgrupi hulgas, sest sellistel 
ettevõtetel puuduvad tavaliselt ressursid spetsiifilise oskusteabe väljastpoolt 
hankimiseks. 
 
Töö piirangud ning soovitused edasisteks uuringuteks 
 
Töösse lisatud artiklites esineb mitmeid piiranguid, millega tuleb töö tulemuste 
kasutamisel arvestada ning neid võimalusel tulevastes uuringutes käsitleda: 
1. Töös on ebaõnnestunud ettevõtetena käsitletud ainult pankrotistunud ette-
võtteid. Seetõttu ei pruugi töö tulemused olla kasutatavad teiste eba-
õnnestumise definitsioonide korral. 
2. Artiklis 1 oli andmekogum väike (mõlemast riigist 70 ettevõtet) ning Artiklis 
4 vaadeldi ainult Eesti ettevõtteid, mistõttu on nende artiklite (rahvus-
vaheline) üldistusvõime madalam kui Artiklite 2 ja 3 puhul, mis hõlmasid 
suuremat hulka erinevaid Euroopa riike. 
3. Töös kasutatud ebaõnnestumise põhjused pärinevad kohtulahenditest, kuhu 
need on omakorda lisatud pankrotihalduri poolt esitatud aruannetest. 
Pankrotihalduritelt pärinevat infot on kasutanud ka varasemad olulised 
teadustööd (näiteks Baldwin et al. 1997, Thornhill ja Amit 2003). Vastava 
info kasutamise puuduseks on see, et pankrotihaldurite lõikes võivad 
põhjuste tuvastamise meetodid varieeruda. 
4. Töö on mitmete uurimisküsimuste osas pigem varasemale teaduskirjandusele 
ja empiirilistele andmetele tuginedes teatud aspekte avastava (ing. k. 
exploratory), mitte spetsiifilist teooriat loova ja seda testiva iseloomuga. 
 
Tööd on võimalik tulevastes uurimistöödes mitmel viisil edasi arendada, nagu 
näiteks: 
1. Analüüsi on võimalik kaasata suurem arv riike. Töö käsitles teatud hulka 
Euroopa Liidu liikmesriike, kuid sarnast analüüsi oleks andmete olemasolul 
võimalik läbi viia ka teiste kontinentide riikide näitel. 
2. Töös leiti küll vastused küsimustele, miks ja kuidas ettevõtted eba-
õnnestuvad, kuid ei uuritud, miks on ebaõnnestumise protsessid riikide 
lõikes erinevad. 
3. Töös kasutatakse sarnaselt varasemale teaduskirjandusele ettevõtete majan-
dusaasta aruannete andmeid, kuid ebaõnnestumise protsessi veel täpsemaks 
mõistmiseks oleksid vajalikud lühemate ajaperioodide andmed, nagu näiteks 
ettevõtete maksudeklaratsioonide ja maksuvõlgade andmed kuude kaupa. 
4. Amadeuse andmebaas sisaldab ainult ettevõtete bilanssidest ja kasumi-
aruannetest pärinevaid andmeid, mille põhjal on küll võimalik välja arvutada 
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erinevaid rahavoogusid, kuid analüüsi rikastaks kindlasti ka rahavoogude 
aruannete olemasolu. 
5. Oluline uurimisvaldkond seisneb ebaõnnestuva ettevõtte juhi otsustus-
protsessi lahtimõtestamises. Eriti huvitav on see mikro- või väikeettevõtete 
kontekstis, kus sageli kõigi juhtimisvaldkondade eest vastutab üks inimene. 
6. Pankrotiga kulmineeruv ettevõtete ebaõnnestumine on väga vähe uuritud 
ettevõtete rahvusvahelistumist käsitlevas kirjanduses, mistõttu on töö autoril 
võimalik tulevikus neid kahte uurimisvaldkonda siduda. Kuna töö autor on 
hetkel seotud ekspordimustreid käsitleva teadusprojektiga, siis esimesed 
sammud on nimetatud valdkonnas praeguseks ka juba tehtud. 
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